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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) U.C.A. (1953), as
amended, governing appeals in divorce matters and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

DID THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
REJECTING THE PETITIONER'S LEGAL ARGUMENT THAT THE
IRA FUNDS HOUSING THE BRP AND DCP BECAME TRANSMUTTED?
A. Standard of Review.
A reviewing court applies a deferential standard of review to the trial
court's findings of fact, repudiating them only if they are clearly erroneous.
Rappleve v. Rappleye, 99 P.3d 348 (Ut. App. 1994). To challenge a trial court's
finding of fact, the challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented
at trial which tends to support the finding and demonstrate why it is clearly

V

erroneous. Barge v. Facio, 88 P.3d 350 (Ut. App. 2004). On the other hand, the
reviewing court affords no degree of deference to a trial court's conclusion of law
and reviews the same for correctness. Rappleye v. Rappleye, supra.
In reviewing a trial court's division of property, the reviewing court must
find that the division works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a
clear abuse of discretion. Barge v. Facio, supra. Changes will be made in a trial
court's property division determination of retirement accounts in a divorce action
"'only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the
findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.'" Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716, 718 (Ut. App. 1991)(citations omitted).
B. Raised Below.
The issue was raised numerous times below. For example see Record, p.
112, 267, and Transcript, p. 733.
DID THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
ADOPTING THE SMITH THEORY OF DIVIDING THE PARTIES'
IRA ACCOUNTS?
A. Standard of Review.
The same standard of review identified under Issue I applies.
B. Raised Below.
The issue was raised numerous times below. For example see Record, p.
112, 267, and Transcript, p. 736.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY DENYING THE PETITIONER A
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE BELOW AND IS SHE ENTITLED
TO REASONABLE FEES IF SUCCESSFUL ON APPEAL?
A. Standard of Review.
2

An award of attorney's fees in a divorce action rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of
discretion. Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438 (Ut. App. 1998). It is an abuse of
discretion to award less than claimed without any reasonable justification if other
factors supporting an award are present. Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Ut. App.
1996).
B. Raised Below.
These issues were raised during testimony and final arguments with the
trial court. Transcript, p 723, 728, and Trial Exhibit P-12.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Section 30-3-3(1) U.C.A. (1953), as amended:
"(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any
action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may
order a party to pay the costs, attorney's fees, and witness fees,
including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other
party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include
provision for costs of the action."
Section 30-3-5(1) U.C.A. (1953), as amended:
"(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations,
and parties...."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case. This is a divorce case where the trial court was required to
divide three the parties1 IRA accounts, personal property, debt, and award alimony. No
3

children were involved. The only significant assets of the parties were the three IRA
accounts. This case involves the proper evaluation and division of the three IRA
accounts. The three IRA accounts represent lump-sum distributions that were rolled over
from the Respondent's early retirement from PacifiCorp on March 1, 2001. The
distributions totaled $583,358.48. The three IRA accounts represented the Respondent's
rollover distributions from PacifiCorp's Basic Retirement Plan ("BRP"), Deferred
Contribution Plan ("DCP"), and 401k Plan ("401k").
Serious questions existed below, as it does on appeal, concerning the proper
identification and valuation of the pre and post marital interests of the parties, whether
transmutation of the assets occurred, the application of active and passive appreciation
rules, and the wrongful withdrawals by the Respondent. Further, serious questions
existed below, as it does on appeal, whether the court should simply divide the IRA
accounts by a modified coverture formula giving Respondent equal weight to each
service year of employment with PacifiCorp as advocated by Respondent, or by
identifying and valuing the pre and post martial estates and dividing them accordingly as
advocated by the Petitioner, in a case where, as here, the overwhelming value of the
funds grew during the parties' marriage.
Even though the Respondent's retirement interests grew from $135,394.30 at the
time of the parties' marriage on February 13, 1993. to $583,358.48, as of March 1, 2001,
or by $447,964.18, the trial court awarded the Petitioner the sum of only $66,274.60.
The Petitioner seeks an equal division of the retirement assets that grew during
their marriage and attorney's fees.

Course of proceedings. The Petitioner, Brenda Joy Oliekan, filed her Petition for
Divorce on December 30, 2002. (Record, p. 1.). The Respondent filed an Answer on
January 30, 2003. (Record, p. 24). On February 4, 2003, the trial court entered a
Temporary Order (Addendum F) containing material provisions as follows:
"4.
Each party is ordered to assume and pay, and hold harmless the
other therefrom, their own individual debts and obligations from the date
of separation on December 15,2002. In the event a dispute exists
concerning whether a debt was incurred before or after separation, either
party may petition the Court for a resolution.
*#*

6.
In addition to the Respondent's own individual debts incurred since
separation, the Respondent is ordered to pay the second mortgage on the
parties' residence to Dream House Mortgage in the approximate amount
$562.25 per month in a timely manner, the debt to CitiBank, MBNA, the
indebtedness on the Dutchman Trailer, and American Express.
***

8.
Each party is restrained and enjoined from selling, gifting,
transferring, alienating, pledging, or otherwise disposing of the parties'
marital assets."
Thereafter, during discovery, Petitioner served Respondent with
Interrogatories. (Trial Exhibit P-16). Interrogatory No. 10 asked the Respondent to
identify all retirement interests in PacifiCorp and to identify the value of such accounts as
of February 13, 1993, the date of marriage between the parties. The Respondent
answered by stating under oath that the "lump-sum equivalent value" of his BRP was
$46,159.00. He also stated under oath that the "lump-sum equivalent value" of his DCP
was $67,994.00. As to Respondent's 401k plan, the trial court concluded that the
Respondent's premarital value was $21, 251.12 as of February 13,1993. Altogether, the
Respondent's premarital interests were $135,394.30 as of February 13, 1993.
A pre-trial conference occurred on July 21, 2003, and the case was certified for
trial. (Record, p. 54). Trial was scheduled for November 14, 2003. On November 6,

5

2003, Respondent moved to continue the trial because he had retained an expert witness,
Roger Smith, to analyze the IRA accounts and lacked sufficient information from
PacifiCorp to complete his report prior to trial. (Record, p. 70). During the hearing on
Respondent's Motion, the court continued the trial without date and ordered that the
parties' submit written briefs regarding division of the IRA accounts. (Record, p. 108).
Trial subsequently occurred over five separate days, May 26, 2004, June 26,
2004, July 22, 2004, August 25, 2004, and October 1, 2004. During the trial, the trial
court engaged in numerous lengthy off-record discussions of the issues with the parties'
counsel.1 The trial court further indicated that there was insufficient case law to guide the
court on the issues presented and, regardless of his decision, the case would likely be
appealed. (Transcript, p. 343). At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court overruled
Petitioner's Objection Regarding Certain Rulings Regarding Retirement Accounts
(Record, p. 262) and entered a Decree of Divorce (Addendum A) and Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law (Addendum B) on March 2,2005.
The Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on April 1, 2005. (Record, p. 348). The
Respondent filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on April 11, 2005. (Record, p. 363).
Disposition below. The trial court rejected the Petitioner's arguments regarding
transmutation, the straightforward valuation approach advocated by the Petitioner,
application of the active-passive appreciation rules, and other arguments described below.
Instead, the trial court adopted the Respondent's approach of using a modified coverture
fraction to divide the IRA accounts that gave equal weight to each of the Respondent's
service years. In doing so, the trial court found the valuation of the pre and post marital

1

The trial court intentionally made a record of the fact such lengthy off-record discussions
occurred. (Transcript, p. 731).
6

interests of the parties immaterial and adopted a heretofore unknown and unrecognized
modified version of the Woodward formula known as the "Smith Model" to divide the
IRA accounts. As stated above, the trial court's legal rulings resulted in the Petitioner
receiving only the sum of $66,274.60 out of $447,964.18, that was generated during the
parties' marriage.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Background Facts.
The operative facts in this case are not disputed.2 The Petitioner was born on June
6, 1950, and the Respondent was born on November 12,1946. The parties were married
on February 13,1993, in Bountiful, Utah. Both had prior marriages. They had no
biological children together, although the Respondent adopted two of the Petitioner's
minor children and had three adult children from a prior marriage. (Transcript, p. 281
and 423). Both were in good health.
Prior to and during the marriage, the Petitioner was employed by the State of
Utah, Adult Probation and Parole, as an office manager and supervisor. (Transcript, 293).
She remains so employed. The Respondent began working for Utah Power & Light
Company on April 7, 1969, and continued working for its successor PacifiCorp3 as a
construction supervisor in line work and substation construction. As discussed more
fully below, the Respondent accepted an early retirement on March 1, 2001. Following
the Respondent's early retirement, the Respondent continued to work for PacifiCorp as

2

While the facts are not disputed, the legal theories to be applied to the facts are hotly debated.

3

PacifiCorp acquired Utah Power & Light on July 1,1989.
7

an independent contractor or consultant on a call-back basis. (Transcript, p. 420). He
performed his services at PacifiCorp's major construction projects located throughout
Utah and Wyoming. (Transcript, p. 422). He remains so employed today.
At the end of July, 2002, the Respondent commenced a job for PacifiCorp in
Lander, Wyoming. (Transcript, p. 20 and 422). At that time, he established a
relationship with Janice Hartwell. (Transcript, p. 20). While the Respondent asserted
that the relationship did not turn romantic until February, 2003 (Transcript, p. 20), he
admitted that he listed Ms. Hartwell's residence and telephone number as his own as
early as October 11,2002 (Transcript, p. 21 and Exhibit P-36), purchased a plane ticket
for Ms. Hartwell and met her in Las Vegas on November 6, 2002 (Transcript, p. 22 and
Exhibit P-34), and made numerous purchases for her and her family in the fall of 2002.
(Transcript, p. 23, p. 55-56, p. 59, and Exhibit P-34).
The Petitioner discovered that the Respondent had purchased Ms. Hartwell's
plane ticket and other items for Ms. Hartwell and her family. (Transcript, p. 284). On
December 2 or 3,2002, she confronted the Respondent and he admitted to her that he was
having an illicit relationship. (Transcript, p. 287). The parties then separated on
December 15, 2002. (Findings of Fact, f 3, Record, p. 311). The Petitioner filed for
divorce on December 30, 2002. (Record, p. 1).
B, Facts Related To Respondent's Retirement Plans While Employed By
PacifiCorp.
Basic Retirement Plan ("BRP"). While employed by PacifiCorp, the
Respondent was covered under a basic retirement plan ("BRP") maintained by
PacifiCorp. The plan document for the BRP was admitted into evidence as Exhibit R-13.
It is a defined benefit plan, or a future benefit plan, funded solely by the employer, and
8

employees are prohibited from making contributions. (Id., % 5.02.3). The normal
retirement date for employees is age 65 but employees may qualify for early retirement
after age 55 with five years of service. (Id., f 6.01-2, 3). The basic retirement monthly
benefit is calculated using a formula that factors in years of service, the employee's
highest average compensation in the last five years, Social Security Income, and other
mathematical computations. (Id., f 6.02-1). Once commenced, the monthly defined
benefit payment continues for the life of the participant, and provides survivorship
spousal options. (Id., ^ 6.11).
Deferred Compensation Plan ("DCP"). In addition to the BRP, the Respondent
was also covered under another defined or future benefit plan identified as a deferred
compensation plan ("DCP"). The plan document for the DCP is contained in Exhibit R13, pages 47-52, and is identified as "Restated Appendix D to PacifiCorp Retirement
Plan."
Important history is associated with the DCP. As stated in the preamble to the
plan document, page 47, the DCP was a plan that applied to certain employees employed
by Utah Power & Light prior to 1989. "Benefit levels" were calculated based upon a
formula that considered the employee's highest annual base salary at the time of
retirement. Following PacifiCorp's acquisition of Utah Power and Light in January,
1989, PacifiCorp continued to provide DCP to its Utah employees. But, on January 1,
1990, PacifiCorp froze the beneft levels at that time by freezing salary levels then in
effect. Thereafter, a lawsuit was initiated in Utah's Federal District Court and a
settlement resulted in a new plan document, Restated Appendix D, that is contained in R13, pages 47-52.

9

The new plan document, Restated Appendix D, provides for the deferred
compensation plan, in addition to the basic retirement plan. It is a defined benefit plan
and is funded by the employer without contributions by the employee. Under the DCP,
monthly benefits are paid for 180 months to the participant or the participant's surviving
spouse in the event of death. (Id., % 4.3). Under the new DCP, instead of calculating the
"benefit levels" based upon the employee's highest annual base salary at the time of
retirement, the benefit level was based upon (A) the employee's highest annual base
salary as of January 1, 1990 (Id., f 3.1), and (B) certain enhancements based upon
increases in salary between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1993, called "Earnings
Classes" and other factors. (Id., f4.5).4
In any event, however, years of service continued to be required for eligibility.
An employee had to be at least 55 years of age to be eligible for any benefits under the
DCP and had to be age 65 in order to receive 100% of the benefit level. For example,
under paragraph 4 of the DCP Plan (page 49), an employee retiring early receives only
51% of the benefit level. This increases to age 65, on a sliding percentage scale, where
the employee receives 100% of the benefit level at retirement. (Id., f 4.2).
PacifiCorp's 401k Plan ("401k ). In addition to the two defined benefit plans
described above, PacifiCorp also maintained a defined contribution plan for its
employees in the form of a 401k plan. The actual plan document was not produced by
the Respondent and was not entered into evidence. The Respondent's expert, Roger
Smith, examined PacifiCorp's annual statements pertaining to the 401k plan and

4

Apparently this reflected a compromise from PacifiCorp's "freezing" of the benefit levels in effect
on January 1, 1990, and contentions by the plaintiffs in the lawsuit filed in the Federal District
Court.
10

concluded that it was a "typical" 401k plan. (Transcript, p. 62). He testified that, by
definition, the 401k plan was not a defined benefit plan and did not provide defined
benefits at a future date, such as at retirement. (Id., p. 216). Instead, an employee's
interest in a 401k plan was based upon the value of the plan and that was determined by
the contributions of the employer and the employee to the plan, forfeitures by other
employees within the plan, and the appreciation or depreciation of the plan assets. (Id., p.
217). An employee's interest in the plan could be determined by the employee's
statements and the account balances therein at any given time. (Id., p. 217).
C. The Respondent's Early Retirement Under PacifiCorp's Workforce Transition
Retirement Program.
In 2000, the Respondent was afforded the opportunity of retiring early from
PacifiCorp under PacifiCorp's Workforce Transition Retirement Program ("WTRP")
even though he did not qualify for normal or early retirement. (Transcript, p. 66,438).
PacifiCorp provided its employees with "paperwork and estimated figures on retirement"
as well as seminars. (Id., p. 438). PacifiCorp provided the Respondent with a document
entitled, "Your Guide to the Workforce Transition Retirement Program" ("the Guide")
that was introduced into evidence as R-14. It also provided the Respondent with a
summary of his retirement benefits available under the WTRP that was introduced into
evidence as R-7 (Addendum D).
Under the WTRP, certain eligible employees, including the Respondent, were
provided numerous incentives to retire early. (Id., the Guide, and Transcript, p. 66). In
Respondent's case, he was afforded two extra years of service and two additional years of
age in calculating benefits under the BRP and DCP. (Id., page 4). In addition, his
retirement benefits were enhanced by calculating his earnings based upon either the
11

highest of his base pay or the final average at retirement (Id.). Under the DCP Plan, he
was afforded a better discount rate if he took his benefits in a lump sum. (IcL, p. 6).
Moreover, the Respondent received a new benefit called the "Bridge Benefit." (Id.).
Under this new benefit, the Respondent was entitled to receive $500.00 a month until he
reached age 65 and was again afforded a more favorable discount rate if he took it in a
lump sum. (Id.).
Altogether, the enhanced benefits offered to the Respondent to retire early in 2001
under the WTRP totaled $116,889.66. (Addendum D and Trial Exhibit R-7). Broken
down, this figure represented $57,740.26 in additional contributions by PacifiCorp to the
BRP, $44,208.45 in the form of the new bridge benefit, and $14,640.95 in additional
contributions by PacifiCorp to the DCP. (Id.).
The Respondent, along with the Petitioner, talked to five or six investment
counselors to make the decision and to determine what to do with the funds if
Respondent accepted early retirement under PacifiCorp's WTRP. (Transcript, p. 438).
Thereafter, on February 1, 2001, the Petitioner signed the required spousal consent in
order for the Respondent to retire early and to receive his defined benefit retirement funds
in a lump sum. (Transcript, p. 364, 437, and P-17). Under the spousal consent, the
Petitioner waived any interest she had to the defined benefit plans as well as any
survivorship options. (Id.). On February 2, 2001, the Respondent elected to receive all
of his retirement funds in the form of lump sums and officially terminated his
employment February 28, 2001. (Exhibit R-l 5).
On March 1, 2001, the Respondent received the sum of $250,251.23 under the
BRP and $146,430.58 under the DCP in two lump sums. (Id., and Transcript, p. 68).
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The parties "rolled over" these two lump sums into two separate IRA accounts at World
Financial In addition, the Respondent cashed out his 401k plan and rolled over
$186,676.67 into a third IRA account at Smedley Financial Services. (Findings of Fact,
No. 12). Altogether, the Respondent received $583,358.48 in lump sum distributions that
were placed in the three separate IRA accounts on March 1, 2001.
At the time the three IRA accounts were created, no effort was made by the
parties to identify or segregate premarital interests from marital interests in the lump
sums and, as Roger Smith testified, such interests were co-mingled. (Transcript, p. 228).
Further, no effort was made to identify employer contributions from employee
contributions, appreciation, forfeitures, etc., in the lump sum received from the 40IK
plan. And, to the extent the interests in all three IRA accounts appreciated, no effort was
made to identify the appreciation, or to classify any as active or passive. (Id., p. 229).
D. Withdrawals between March 1, 2001 and the February 4,2003Temporary
Order.
At the time of Respondent's retirement, March 1, 2001, the Parties commenced
taking automatic withdrawals of $2,100.00 per month from one IRA account that housed
the lump sum received under the Respondent's BRP. (Findings of Fact, f 36). The
parties used these funds for the parties' general needs.5
On April 23, 2002, the sum of $24,977.00 was withdrawn from another IRA
account that housed the lump sum received under the Respondent's 401k plan and was

5

No dispute existed below that these withdrawals for this time period were appropriate and
should have been charged against the marital estate.
13

used to purchase a vehicle for the parties' daughter and to pay taxes associated with the
withdrawal.6 (Findings of Fact, % 19).
Unbeknownst to Petitioner, however, on January 15, 2003, the Respondent
withdrew the sum of $25,200.00 from the IRA account housing the DCP funds.
(Transcript, p. 477). Out of this amount, he gave the Petitioner the sum of $700.00 to
assist in the payment of the parties' state income taxes, and used the balance for his own
personal uses including loaning Janet Hartwell a large sum of money. (Id., and Findings
of Fact, If 28, Record, p. 317).7
E. Respondent's Withdrawals After the February 4,2003 Temporary Order.
Notwithstanding the prohibitions contained in the court's February 4, 2003
Temporary Order against dissipating marital property, the Respondent continued to use
the IRA accounts as his own personal piggy bank. The Respondent made the following
withdrawals after February 4, 2003:
•

He continued to take automatic monthly withdrawals in the amount of
$2,100.00 up to and through trial. (Transcript, p. 467).

•

$13,888.89 on March 21, 2003, from the IRA account used to house the
401k funds. (Findings of Fact, f 20, Record, p. 316).

•

$20,834.00 on February 26, 2004, from the IRA account used to house the
401k funds. (Id., 1121).

Again, no dispute existed below that this withdrawal was appropriate and should have been
charged against the marital estate. These withdrawals were reported appropriately under the
parties' 2001 and 2002 tax returns and the parties paid federal and state taxes on these
withdrawals. Exhibits P-20 and P-21.
7
The trial court found that $700.00 should be charged against the martial estate and the balance
against the Respondent's pre-marital interests.
14

The Petitioner was unaware of the withdrawals and did not provide her consent.
(Transcript, p. 359).
F. Petitioner's Evidence Regarding Respondent's Pre-Marital Interests In the
Respondent's Retirement Plans.
The Petitioner suggested below, as she does on appeal, that the process of
identification, valuation and division of the premarital from marital interests in the IRA
accounts is not a complicated matter. If (and assuming) the premarital and marital
interests did not become so transmuted by events during the marriage and events
following the rollovers into the IRA accounts, so as to lose their identification
altogether , then the court may straightforwardly award each party a 50% interest of the
marital estate by simply deducting the value of the pre-marital interests at the time of
marriage on February 13, 1993, from the value of the accounts that existed on the date of
the rollovers on March 1, 2001, (and award such amount to the Respondent as his
premarital interest) and then divide the marital remainder in half for each party. After
this mathematical process is done, then the court may appropriately determine issues
relating to the withdrawals.
To support the legal theory set forth above, the Petitioner presented direct
evidence as to the value of the Respondent's pre-marital interests in his retirement plans
as of the date of the parties' marriage on February 13, 2003. First, the Petitioner
presented direct evidence as to the Respondent's pre-marital interests in the two defined
benefit plans, the BRP and DCP. The Petitioner introduced the Respondent's own

This legal concept is addressed under Argument, below.
15

Answers to Interrogatories signed under oath during discovery that was introduced as
Exhibit 16:
"INTERROGATORY NO. 10: In reference to the Respondent's retirement
accounts at PacifiCorp, or any predecessor in interest, please identify:
A.
All accounts that was in the name of the Respondent, or being held
for the Respondent's benefit, as of February 13, 1993.
B.
The value of all such accounts identified in subparagraph A above as of
February 13, 1993.
ANSWER: Respondent objects to this interrogatory because it requires a
calculation of a benefit from accounts which did not carry dollar balances, and
this is not connected to admissible evidence. Without waiving this objection,
respondent estimates that the lump sum equivalent value of his basic retirement
plan was $46,149.00. The estimated lump sum equivalent of his deferred
compensation retirement plan was $67,994. Respondent does not presently know
the estimated lump sum value of the stock purchase plan."
The Respondent testified that he contacted PacifiCorp Benefit Services and obtained the
information in order to answer Interrogatory No. 10. (Transcript, p. 48). He never
changed or modified his responses to Interrogatory No. 10 at any time prior to trial. (Id.,
p. 53).
In addition, Petitioner introduced the actual correspondence between Respondent
and PacifiCorp Benefit Services that Respondent relied upon in answering Interrogatory
No. 10. (Addendum D andExhibit P-4). Addendum D and Exhibit P-4 is a letter dated
September 4, 2003, from Shena Harris, Benefits Administrator, PacifiCorp Benefits
Services9, that states:
"You recently requested an estimate of the lump sum retirement benefit
you would have received if you had retired on April 1, 1993. For the
Basic Retirement Plan, you would have received a one-time payment of

9

Shena Harris is also the same individual that Respondent's expert, Roger Smith, relied upon to
gather records, data, compilations, and interpretations of PacifiCorp's plan documents for his own
analysis. (Transcript and testimony of Roger Smith, p. 64,90,167,170, 171, 174-176, and 192).
Roger Smith testified, "They are the people that are in charge of the benefits. So, they're
certainly in the know with how these benefit plans work and all the intricate, often painful details
associated with them." "They perform the benefit calculations." (Jd.).
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$46,148.94. For the Deferred Compensation Plan, you would have
received a one-time payment of $67,994.24.
Second, with respect to the Respondent's pre-marital interest in his 401k plan, the
Petitioner introduced Exhibit P-45 that showed the Respondent had an account balance of
$29,915.85 on the date of the marriage but a premarital loan of $8,664.73 existed against
the account, for a net premarital balance of $21,251.12. Exhibit P-45 is a printout of
Respondent's 401k account history that was provided to the Respondent prior to trial.
(Transcript, p. 509-510). The trial court used these figures in an effort to identify the
Respondent's pre-marital interest in his 401k plan. (Exhibit P-45, Findings of Fact, f 16,
Record, p. 314).
Had the trial court accepted the Petitioner's straightforward legal theory as to the
proper identification, valuation and division of these three IRA accounts (without
considering withdrawals that occurred following the rollovers on March 1, 2001, or other
adjustments such as appreciation, etc.), the computation would have been as follows:
Account
BRP
DCP
401k
Totals

Rollover Total
$250,251.23
$146,430.58
$186,676.67
$583,358.48

Premarital
$46,149.00
$67,994
$21,251.12
$135,394.12

Marital
$204,102.23
$78,436.58
$165,425.55
$447,964.36

The trial court would have awarded each one-half of the marital, or $223,982.18 each,
and the Respondent $135,394.12 for his premarital interests.
To satisfy any marshalling requirement relative to Petitioner's evidence on the
BRP and DCP pre-marital interests, the Petitioner will marshal the evidence by using the
evidence produced during direct examination and during cross-examination. This is done
for purposes of clarity only. Roger Smith, Respondent's expert, testified on direct exam
that the figures in Plaintiffs Exhibit P-4 regarding pre-marital interests should not be
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used. (Transcript, p. 207-209). His primary concern was that the figures identified in
Exhibit P-4 did not reflect events that occurred after the date of the parties' marriage on
February 13, 1993, that, in his opinion, would impact the pre-marital figures. (Id.).
These events include the Bridge Benefit incentive that Respondent received when he took
early retirement in 2001, and did not take into consideration an annuity factor for years
occurring after 1993. (Id.). He concluded that the figures in Exhibit P-4 could not be
incorporated into the "Smith Model" of dividing the retirement accounts to render any
meaningful analysis because he fundamentally believed that the IRA accounts should be
divided using a formula giving the Respondent's employment service years equal weight.
(Id.).
On cross-examination, Roger Smith testified that he was not familiar with the
theory advocated by the Petitioner relative to the identification of the Respondent's premarital interests in the BRP and the DCP. (Transcript, p. 231). He admitted, however,
that the pre-marital figures of $46,148.94 for the BRP and $67,994.24 for the DCP, as
reflected in Exhibit P-4, represented the only sums of money the Respondent could have
taken from his BRP and DECP from PacifiCorp had he retired or separated from the
company on February 13, 1993. (Id, p. 232). Further, Roger Smith admitted on crossexamination that the figures in Exhibit P-4 represented the Respondent's pre-marital
interests in the BRP and DCP as of February 13, 19993, as determined and valued by
PacifiCorp. (Id., p. 234). Despite these facts, he did not make any model or analysis of
the pre-marital interests based upon the figures contained in Addendum D or Exhibit P-4.
(Id., p. 251). Instead, he created the "Smith Model" to identify the Respondent's premarital interests in Respondent's retirement accounts that is described below.
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Notwithstanding his approach, Roger Smith admitted that the Respondent could not have
gone to the Company on February 13, 1993, and claimed the sums of money Roger Smith
identified as his pre-marital interests using his own "Smith Model" (Id., p. 234-235).
G, Respondent's Evidence Regarding Respondent's Pre-Marital Interests In
Respondent's Retirement Plans and the "Smith Model".
The Respondent's evidence concerning his pre-marital interests, and the marital
interests, were introduced through Roger Smith, CPA, and through an illustrative exhibit
created by Roger Smith, Respondent's Trial Exhibit R-3 (Addendum E), and R-3 A.10 To
better understand Roger Smith's testimony, and the "Smith Model", the Petitioner will
marshal the evidence again using the evidence produced during direct examination and
during cross-examination for purposes of clarity. A starting point, however, is with
Roger Smith's qualifications and his assignments by Respondent's counsel.
Roger Smith's Qualifications and Assignments by Respondent's Counsel. On
direct examination, Roger Smith testified that he was employed by LECG Corporation as
a CPA doing forensic type evaluations for businesses, property assets, and damage
calculations. (Transcript, p. 60). He had been so employed for eight years. (Id.).
Respondent introduced Roger Smith's resume, Exhibit R-24, as demonstrative of his
qualifications. A cursory review of his resume demonstrates that Mr. Smith is well
qualified to perform business and commercial valuations and present expert testimony
related thereto.

For purposes of this Appeal Brief, Petitioner will cite to Trial Exhibit R-3 (Addendum D). Trial
Exhibit R-3A is merely an updated version of Trial Exhibit R-3 to reflect the changing values of the
three IRA's as they changed during the trial. (Transcript, p. 119). Trial Exhibit R-3 represented
the IRA account values as of May 17, 2004, and Trial Exhibit R-3A represented the IRA account
values as of June 16, 2004. (Jd.). After the court entered its rulings in the case, a third version of
Trial Exhibit R-3 was received on October 20, 2004, that was used to compute the figures for the
court's Findings of Fact. However, such document is not in evidence.
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Mr. Smith testified on direct examination that he was given the assignment by
Respondent's counsel of separating out the premarital interests from the marital interests
in Respondent's three retirement accounts. (Id., p. 61). Respondent's counsel instructed
Mr. Smith how to treat certain facts, such as treating all withdrawals as being charged
against the marital estate. (Id., p. 73). With respect to the DCP, Respondent's counsel
instructed him to make two separate analyses. (Id., p. 74-75).
On cross-examination11, Roger Smith testified that he was not an independent
expert, such as an expert assigned by the court to perform accounting functions. (Id., p.
210). He admitted he had no formal training in divorce law. (Id., p. 211). With respect
to his assignment of separating premarital and marital interests, Mr. Smith admitted he
did not employ any legal principles and applied his own instincts. (Id., p. 212). He was
unaware that any presumption existed at law that all properties were considered marital
and the burden to exclude properties as premarital was on the party asserting it. (Id., p.
213). He did not know of the legal principle that one cannot speculate as to what is
considered pre-marital and marital. (Id., p. 213). Roger Smith was unaware of the
concepts of active and passive appreciation. (Id., p. 215).
While Mr. Smith was not familiar with the term "coverture faction" (Id., p. 216),
he testified that Respondent's counsel instructed him to apply a Woodward type formula
in this case. (Id., p. 226). And, Roger Smith's understanding of the Woodward formula,
which came from Respondent's counsel, was that it was an allocation based solely upon
years of service and that it applied to future benefits under a defined benefit plan. (Id., p.

11

The trial court noted in the record that Roger Smith was "being a bit of an advocate" during
cross-examination and instructed Mr. Smith to answer the questions posed and he would have an
opportunity of explaining any answer he gave on redirect. (Transcript, p. 256).
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216). Mr. Smith defined the Woodward formula as one where each year of service
counted the same as any other year of service and one merely compares the number of
premarital years to the marital years. (Id-> p. 230).
Mr. Smith admitted that there is more than one way to value retirement accounts.
(Id.). With respect to defined benefit plans, or future benefit plans, one way is to
compute the future income stream, and convert that figure to present dollars using a
discount factor. In the alternative, another way is to employ the Woodward formula.
(Id., p. 214).
With respect to his assignments, Roger Smith admitted on cross-examination that
he merely followed the instructions of Respondent's counsel and did not exercise any
independent judgment. (Id., p. 227). He testified he was not charged to interpret any of
the retirement plans in this case, or their nuances. (Id., p. 225-226). In fact, Roger Smith
repeatedly stated that, "I'm just a numbers guy" (e.g., Id., p. 226) and did not form any
opinion whether it was appropriate or not to employ the Woodwardformula in this case.
(Id., p. 226-227). He admitted he was not an expert in retirement plans and did not know
or understand any of the fundamental legal principles about marital estates, whether
premarital or marital. (Id., p. 226).
Respondent's Evidence on Premarital and Marital Interests. The Respondent
did not attempt to use a valuation approach in determining the premarital and marital
interests of the IRAs that housed the defined benefit plans. Instead, the Respondent
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attempted to ascertain the premarital and marital interests using a modified coverture
formula.12
Roger Smith distinguished between the IRA accounts that housed defined benefit
funds and the IRA account that housed the 401k funds. (Exhibit 3A). He applied a
different methodology for the two IRA accounts housing the defined benefits than the
one housing the 401k funds. The Petitioner will discuss the two IRA accounts housing
the defined benefit funds first and the account housing the 401k funds second.
IRA accounts housing defined benefit funds. On direct examination, Roger
Smith testified that the sums in the IRA accounts from the BRP and the DCP represented
the present value of all future defined benefits Respondent would have received had he
remained under the plans, retired, and died, discounted to their present dollars. (Id., p.
68). In order to separate pre-marital from marital, Mr. Smith first employed a date
calculator to identify the period of time deemed pre-marital and the period deemed
marital to create the backbone of the "Smith Model." (Exhibit 6 of Trial Exhibit R-3).13
(Id., p. 154). The date calculation was the Respondent's effort to apply the Woodward
formula to the IRA accounts. (Id., p. 156). Roger Smith identified the premarital time
period as being that period of time from the Respondent's date of hire to the date of the
parties' marriage. He identified the marital time period as the time from the date of

12

Noteworthy is the fact that Roger Smith's formula resulted in widely different results. Compare
his initial analysis filed with the court on November 6, 2003 (Record, p. 74), with Respondent's
Trial Exhibit R-3. In the former document, he found the marital interest to be $160,188.88 and in
the latter he found the marital interest to be $86,688.90.
13
Trial Exhibit R-3 is a document comprised of seven (7) "exhibits." These exhibits should not be
confused with the numbered exhibits admitted at trial.
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marriage to the Respondent's date of retirement.

Using these periods, and the date

calculator, Roger Smith identified the premarital percentage as 74.79% and the marital
percentage as 25.21%. See Exhibit 6 of Trial Exhibit 6. This is Smith's modified
coverture fraction.
Next, Mr. Smith determined the cash values of the IRA accounts housing the BRP
and DCP funds at a date closest to the trial.15 (Transcript, p. 74). See Exhibits 5 and 5.1
of Trial Exhibit R-3. He then added back in the withdrawals to these cash values, as
directed by Respondent's counsel, to arrive at a figure he claimed represented the cash
value of the accounts prior to the withdrawals.16
Next, Mr. Smith then applied the premarital percentage of 74.79% and, after
factoring in the withdrawals that had been made and allocating them all to the marital
estate, concluded that there were no funds left in either the BRP or the DCP (using
Alternative 1 that is discussed below) to divide. See Exhibit 5, 5.1, and 1 of Trial Exhibit
R-3.
Relative to the DCP plan, Roger Smith was instructed to make two models or
alternatives. (Transcript, p. 74-75 and Exhibit 5 of R-3). Alternative 1 assumed that
everything in the IRA account housing the DCP was premarital. (Id., p. 77). This

14

This concept of "marital time" was objected to by Petitioner and was a subject of debate in
itself. Hence it is referred to as a "modified" coverture fraction. Under the Woodward formula, the
period of time deemed marital is that period of time from the date of the parties' marriage to the
date of the divorce. In this case, that period of time would have been from February 13,1993 to
March 2, 2005, or approximately 12 years. Because Mr. Smith defined the marital time as that
time from the date of marriage from February 13,1993, to the date of the Respondent's
retirement, or March 1, 2001, the marital period was shortened to approximately 8 years. This
resulted in a greatly inflated percentage figure favoring the Respondent significantly.
15

Exhibit R-3A represents the cash values as of June 16, 2005. (Transcript, p. 119).

16

Smith's formula did not account for the earnings or losses of the withdrawals in his formula. In
an effort to remedy Petitioner's objection to this fact, the court ordered the Respondent to restore
the accounts with interest for purposes of Smith's formula. Findings of Fact, ^ 23 and ff39.
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assumption was based upon the Respondent's interpretation, set forth below, of Restated
Appendix D, relating to the DCP plan that is described above under Facts, Subpart B.
Alternative 2 assumed that the court might reject Respondent's interpretation of
Appendix D and further assumed that the court would apply the Smith Model, or a
modified coverture fraction, in dividing the premarital from the marital accounts.
(Transcript, p. 164). Under Alternative 1, the Petitioner would have had no interest in the
DCP. Under Alternative 2, after applying the Smith modified coverture fraction, the
premarital interest was identified as being $108,023.08 and the marital interest was
identified as $36,412.11. Under Alternative 2, the Petitioner's interest was $18,206.05.
The trial court concluded that the determination of which alternative to use was a
legal question and not a factual question. (Transcript, p. 81). The Respondent argued
that the DCP benefits became "set and frozen" as of 1/1/90, prior to marriage, and
therefore the Petitioner was not entitled to any portion of the DCP benefits. (Id., p. 82
and 168). The Petitioner cited the preamble language found in Exhibit R-13, p. 47, that
referred to the history underlying Restated Appendix D. The Petitioner further argued
that the freeze described in the preamble language only applied to the salary levels then
in effect used to calculate the benefit levels, described in paragraph 3 of the Restated
Appendix D, and employees were still required to acquire service years to become
eligible for any benefits, as in any other defined benefit plan. (Transcript, p. 253-256).
The Petitioner pointed out that the Respondent did not even qualify for benefits under the
DCP when the salary levels were frozen and he had to work at least nine more marital
years to qualify for any benefits under the DCP. (Id.). And, indeed, in 2001, the
Respondent still would not have qualified for any benefits under the DCP but for the
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enhanced incentives (of adding Active years of service and Active years of age) provided
by PacifiCorp in its Workforce Transition program. (Id., p. 258).
The trial court ultimately adopted Alternative 2. (Findings of Fact, ^f 31). The
trial court held the view that, even though the benefit level was frozen under the DCP
prior to marriage, the years after marriage enabled the Respondent to gain service years
and be an employee on the date of retirement in order to qualify for the benefit. (Id.).
IRA Accounts housing 401k funds. The Respondent failed to produce and
introduce PacifiCorp's 401k Plan Document. Notwithstanding, the Respondent used an
extrapolation process to determine the premarital and marital interests. Roger Smith's
starting point for analyzing the IRA account housing the 401k funds was Exhibit 2.1 of
Trial Exhibit R-3 (Addendum E). (Transcript, p. 70). He first assumed that the
premarital balance of the 401k plan was $31,530.68.17 (See Exhibit 3 of Trial Exhibit R3). Because he did not have the Respondent's monthly account statements (Transcript,
p. 70)18, Mr. Smith extrapolated and created a table (Exhibit 2.1 of Trial Exhibit R-3) to
calculate what the Respondent's premarital interest in the 401k would have been on
3/1/01, when the Respondent retired. In order to create an assumed rate of growth on the
Respondent's premarital interest as it existed on the date of marriage on 2/13/93, Mr.
Smith "backed out" the contributions made by the Respondent and the Company for each
year thereafter to arrive at an "estimated" rate of return for each year. (Transcript, p. 71).

This figure was taken from Trial Exhibit P-45. (Transcript, p. 237). Mr. Smith failed to consider,
however, that the Respondent had a loan against his 401k plan at the time in the amount of
$8,664.73 that the trial court ultimately deducted from value of the premarital interest. (Findings
of Fact, 1f16).
18
The trial court "struggled" with the fact the Respondent failed to produce the actual statements,
"But it was within your ability, it seems to me, to obtain the accurate, actual numbers. That's what
I am struggling with." (Transcript, p. 126).
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Using these calculations, Mr. Smith concluded that the Respondent's premarital interest
in the 401k was $64,318.85. (Exhibit 2.1 of Trial Exhibit R-3).
Mr. Smith then identified the figure of $186,676.67 received by the parties on
3/1/01, in their IRA account when the 401k funds were rolled over. Next, he compared
his calculated premarital interest of $64,318.85 to the figure of $186,676.67 as it existed
on 3/1/01, to determine that the premarital percentage in the IRA account as of 3/1/01,
was 34.45% and the marital percentage was 65.55%. (Id., and Transcript, p. 72). Again,
Mr. Smith ignored the additional years of marriage after 3/1/01, in his calculation of these
percentages.
Next, using the value of the IRA account that housed the 401k funds on the date
closest to trial, i.e., $150,630.78 on May 17, 2004, he added back in the withdrawals that
had been made to the account, and then applied the percentage figures described above to
determine the premarital and marital interests. (Exhibit 2 and Transcript, p. 72). Using
this formula, Roger Smith determined that the 401k IRA account housed $63,941.88 in
premarital funds and $86,688.90 in marital funds.
The trial court agreed with the Petitioner that Mr. Smith improperly failed to
consider the outstanding loan when computing the Respondent's initial premarital
interest. Therefore, a recalculation was performed and the court determined that the
Respondent's ultimate premarital interest in the IRA account was $43,349.76 and the
marital interest was $143,326.91, for a total of $186,676.67 on March 1, 2001, when the
rollover occurred. (Findings of Fact, Tf 17 and 18). Expressed as a percentage, the
Respondent's premarital interest was 23.22% and the marital interest was 76.78%. (Id.).
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The trial court next ordered the Respondent to make whole the IRA account
caused by the Respondent's wrongful withdrawals. Again, using the account balance in
the IRA account that housed the 401k funds as of June 16, 2004, the trial court concluded
that the premarital portion was $51,275.28 and the marital portion was $169,507.32 based
upon the percentages of 23.22% and 76.78% being applied. (Id., % 24).
Below, the Petitioner argued unsuccessfully that Mr. Smith's analysis was flawed
because he failed to distinguish between active and passive appreciation in calculating the
Respondent's premarital interest. (Transcript, p.734, 739). Mr. Smith admitted that he
was unfamiliar with these concepts and did not apply them in his analysis. (Id., p. 215).
Instead, in determining a rate of return to be assigned the Respondent's initial premarital
interest of $21,251.12 existing on date of the parties' marriage, and carrying that figure
forward to March 1, 2001, Mr. Smith simply compared the account balance at the
beginning of the year to the account balance at the end of the year (from February, 1993
to March 2001) and the difference was computed as the annual rate of return.
(Transcript, p. 134-138 and Exhibit 4 of Trial Exhibit R-3). These assumptions are well
defined in Mr. Smith's footnotes to Exhibit 4 of Trial Exhibit R-3 (Addendum E). As
pointed out by the Petitioner, not only did Mr. Smith's assumptions bear no resemblance
to the account statements entered into evidence as Trial Exhibit P-45, the inflated rate of
return afforded the Respondent was caused by Mr. Smith ignoring active-passive
appreciation rules by improperly including general earnings, forfeitures and company
contributions in the calculation to determine rate of growth. (Transcript, p. 739-741).
And, given the fact that Mr. Smith used a flawed percentage method to subsequently
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divide the funds to be distributed from the IRA account, the premarital figure used in the
equation became a "double whammy."

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Petitioner respectfully argues that the trial court clearly abused its discretion
by failing to recognize that the IRA accounts became so transmuted following the parties'
marriage that any attempt to divide them using the hypothetical Smith Model was too
speculative. The Petitioner submits that her evidence as to the Respondent's premarital
interests in the IRA accounts was clear, reliable and creditable. She argues that the trial
court clearly abused its discretion by in appropriately adopting the Smith Model, which
contained a modified coverture fraction as its backbone, to divide the parties' accounts.
In so doing, the trial court deprived the Petitioner of an equal division of the marital
portion of the IRA accounts.
The Petitioner respectfully contends that the trial court erred when it only
awarded her a portion of the attorney's fees and costs she incurred at trial below. If
successful on appeal, she respectfully requests an award of attorney's fees and costs to be
determined on remand.

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
REJECTING THE PETITIONER'S LEGAL ARGUMENT THAT THE
IRA FUNDS HOUSING THE BRP AND DCP BECAME
TRANSMUTTED.
Premarital assets may become transmuted by commingling with marital assets
and loss of identity. Unless the premarital and marital interests are reasonably capable of
being determined, then the entire asset is considered marital property. Brett R. Turner,
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Equitable Distribution of Property, § 524, p. 275; Dunn v. Dunn, 803 P.2d 1314, 1321
(Ut. App. 1990)(Premarital property was consumed and its identification lost through
commingling and exchanges)("Premarital property may lose is separate distinction where
the parties have inextricably commingled it into the marital estate.. ..") 19 ; Naranio v.
Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Ut. App. 1985)(personal injury award); and Schaumberg v.
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Ut. App. 1994)(down payment on building). Transmutation
is a legal concept. The transmutation concept is particularly important here with respect
to the IRAs housing the BRP and DCP. Unless the funds may be reasonably identified as
to their premarital and marital natures, the concept of transmutation requires that all
property be deemed marital.
It should be first noted that the Petitioner's transmutation argument is not being
advocated to advance the theory that she is entitled to one-half of all funds in the IRA
accounts although, strictly applied, the transmutation argument could reach that far.
Instead, the Petitioner's transmutation argument concedes the Respondent's premarital
interests in the BRP and DCP as represented in Addendum D and Trial Exhibit P-4 under
the Petitioner's valuation approach and transmutation applies only to the facts that arose
after the date of the parties' marriage on February 13, 1993, to the date of trial. The
Petitioner's transmutation argument is simply this: in balancing which legal theory to
apply to avoid speculation and assure accuracy and fairness in the division of accounts,
such as IRA accounts, a trial court should first consider whether the assets in the accounts
became so transmuted as to make one valuation method more accurate and fair as

19

This treatise is widely cited by courts in the United States as authoritative on the equitable
distribution of property in divorce cases. It is also cited by Judge Michael D. Lyon in his article,
"The Source of Funds Rule-Equitably Classifying Separate and Martial Property.", Utah Bar
Journal, p. 45.
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compared to the other. And, in this case, given the transmutations involved, the
Petitioner advocated below, as she does on appeal, that the straightforward valuation
approach was far more accurate and fair than the application of the Smith Model.
In this case, the following are factors affecting the transmutation of the IRA
accounts. First, the overwhelming growth in the Respondent's retirement interests grew
during the period of the parties' marriage, prior to the Respondent's early retirement
They grew from $135,394.30 at the time of the marriage on February 13, 1993, to
$583,358.48 as of March 1, 2001, or by the sum of $447,964.18. Second, a very
significant portion of the $447,964.18 growth, or the sum of $116,889.66 (roughly onefourth), occurred in 2001 when the parties agreed20 to participate in PacifiCorp's WTRP
and retire early with enhanced benefits. None of this may be classified as premarital.
Third, the Respondent's interests in PacifiCorp's two retirement plans lost their identity
when they were converted from defined benefit plans, cashed out, and rolled over into the
two IRA Accounts. Likewise, the 401k plan lost its identity when rolled into another
IRA Account. Fourth, the parties made no effort to segregate marital from premarital
interests in the Respondent's retirement interests when they were rolled over into IRA
accounts on March 1, 2001. Fourth, the IRA accounts existed in fact from March 1,
2001, until the trial court ordered them divided on March 2, 2005 (a period of four years),
and it is impermissible speculation to attempt to segregate out within these three IRA
accounts the appreciation/depreciation on the Respondent's premarital interests that
existed as of February 13,1993, from the normal contributions, forfeitures and

Not only did the Respondent have to agree to PacifiCorp's WTRP, the Petitioner had to agree
as well by, inter alia, signing a waiver of her spousal benefits under PacifiCorp's Retirement Plan.
(Transcript, p. 364, 437, and Trial Exhibit P-17).
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appreciation/depreciation of the marital estate for the period of 2/13/93 - 3/1/01, and
from the enhancement given under PacifiCorp's WTRP of $116,889.66 on March 1,
2001, that was entirely marital in nature. Lastly, transmutation occurred as a result of the
many withdrawals in this case, some deemed proper by the trial court and some deemed
improper. The parties made monthly withdrawals in the amount of $2,100.00 from the
IRA account that housed the BRP funds for the period of 3/1/01 to 2/4/03, and when they
withdrew $24,977.00 on April 23, 2002, for a car for their child. These withdrawals were
deemed proper by the court and charged against the marital estate. However, the
Respondent made improper withdrawals, in violation of the Temporary Order, by
continuing the monthly withdrawals of $2,100.00 for his own benefit up to the point of
trial, as well withdrawals on January 15, 2003, of $25,200.00, $13,888.89 on March 21,
2003, and $20,834.00 on February 26, 2004.
In short, the Petitioner argued below, as she does on appeal, that all of the above
transactions resulted in a complete loss of identity of premarital from marital funds and a
commingling that could not rationally be segregated without sheer speculation. As stated
in Dunn, supra, p. 1321:
"Premarital property was consumed and its identification lost through
commingling and exchanges.. ..Premarital property may lose its separate
distinction where the parties have inextricably commingled it into the marital
estate or where one spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the
marital estate."
The Petitioner argued below, as she does on appeal, that the court's decision on what
legal theory to apply to properly identify, value and divide the IRA accounts was a legal
decision and not a factual one. And, when deciding whether to adopt the Petitioner's
legal theory of a straightforward valuation approach or the Respondent's hypothetical

31

Smith Model, the many transmutation factors compel the application of the
straightforward valuation approach.
The trial court's decision to ignore transmutation was a clear abuse of discretion.
The obligation of a trial court is to apply the legal theory that best accords the parties'
accuracy and fairness. By rejecting the Petitioner's legal argument of transmutation, and
the Petitioner's valuation approach, the trial court wandered off course into the realm of
speculation and conjecture and abused its discretion.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY ADOPTING THE SMITH THEORY OF DIVIDING THE
PARTIES' IRA ACCOUNTS.
A. Introduction.
The parties advocated below two separate legal theories on how the parties' IRA

accounts should be divided. The trial court admittedly struggled with this legal question,
(e.g Transcript, p. 342-344). The Petitioner argued the valuation approach. The
Respondent argued the adoption of a new legal theory, the "Smith Model", for dividing
the accounts. Because the Smith Model did not value the premarital and marital interests,
and simply divided the IRA accounts using a modified coverture fraction that gave equal
weight to each year of service, the fact that the Respondent's retirement accounts grew
during the parties' marriage by $447,964.18 was ignored by the trial court and deemed
immaterial.21

21

Hence, in the trial court's Findings of Fact, If 26 (dealing with the DCP) and U 34 (dealing with
the BRP), the trial court found that the DCP and BRP "had no relevant account balance at any
time prior to [their] conversion...on March 1, 2001." The word "relevant" was placed in the
findings following the Petitioner's objections to reflect that the trial court did not deem the figures
in Trial Exhibit P-4, Addendum D, as relevant in light of the fact the trial court adopted the
coveture formula of the Smith Model and spread out all growth and appreciation of the marital
years over 31.9 years of employment.
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In order to determine the viability and applicability of the Smith Model, it is
important to examine basic Utah law on the identification, valuation and division of
premarital from marital interests in divorce proceedings.
First, the Petitioner was an equal partner in this marriage and she is entitled to an
equal distribution of marital assets. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 754 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Ut. App.
1988). This includes retirement benefits. Englert v. Englert 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Ut.
1978) and Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Ut. App. 1989). "It is well settled that the
present value, as well as any deferred earnings of retirement accounts accrued during the
marriage, are marital assets and, whenever possible, should be valued as of the time of
the divorce and be equitably divided. Dunn v. Dunn, 803 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Ut. App.
1990).
Second, while Utah is a dual classification state, a presumption exists that
ff

[m]arital property 'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties,

whenever obtained and from whatever source derived,1" Sorensen v. Sorensea 769 P.2d
820, 824 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah
1988). In distributing property in divorce proceedings, trial courts should "first properly
categorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate property of
one or the other." Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Ut. App. 1991); and Elman v.
Ehnan, 45 P.3d 176, 180 (Ut. App. 2002). Generally, the trial court is required to award
premarital property, and appreciation on that property, to the spouse who brought the
property into the marriage. Id. This likewise includes retirement assets. And the reverse
is true also. The court is required to divide any marital property acquired during the
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marriage, as well as any appreciation on the marital property equitably between the
parties. Dunn, supra, p. 1319 and Englert supra, p. 1276.
Third, the burden of proof rests on the party wishing to exclude property from the
marital estate. Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property, § 5.03, p. 338, and
Supplement, p. 464-465, and cases cited therein. If the party does not meet this burden,
the property in question remains marital property. As a corollary to this principle
involving coverture fractions, the burden of proof rests on the party advocating the
coverture fraction because it operates to exclude a portion of the marital estate. Id., and
Childers v. Childers, 640 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Burdens of proof are significant in this case because of the Respondent's
speculative model used to divide premarital from marital fund in the IRA accounts and
the Respondent's claim of appreciation on his premarital interests relative to the IRA
account housing the 401k funds. Although the Petitioner has the initial burden of
demonstrating total appreciation of the asset in question, the Respondent has the burden
of proof of carving out his rightful claim of passive appreciation. Elman v. Elman supra,
p. 182-183.22
B. Application of the Coverture Fraction.
The retirement assets to be divided in this case consisted of three IRA accounts.
They were not defined benefit plans. The IRA accounts came into existence on March 1,
2001, four years prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce in this case. There is also no
dispute that the IRA accounts were commingled in the sense that they included asserted

In Elman. the court affirmed a district court's finding that the husband was only entitled to a
reasonable rate of return on his premarital interest and allocated all other appreciation to the
marital estate.
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premarital and marital interests, appreciation, as well as substantial enhanced benefits,
and the parties made no effort to distinguish between these interests.
The Petitioner's primary argument before the trial court was that the Smith
Model, that uses a modified coverture fraction as its backbone, should not be used to
identify, value and distribute premarital from marital interests in IRA accounts where
such interests were readily determinable from other credible evidence. The underlying
rationale for the Petitioner's argument was that coverture fractions are used to divide, not
value, defined benefit plans where future benefit interests are at stake. An example is
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) where the court adopted the
coverture fraction. Woodward is now used universally in Utah for dividing future
interests in defined benefit plans. The coverture fraction is that fraction of time incurred
during marriage divided by total time of service years under a defined benefit plan, with
the result divided equally. However, the coverture fraction merely divides a defined
benefit that arises sometime in the future under defined benefit plans, usually arising post
divorce in the form of periodic monthly payments for the life of the participant. It is not
an effort to value premarital and marital interests themselves.
Utah courts have not decided this issue. However, nearly every jurisdiction that
has considered the issue has determined that coverture fractions may not be used to value
premarital and marital interests other than defined benefit plans involving future interests.
Coveture fractions apply solely to future benefit plans and have no application in the
valuation of premarital and marital interests in ordinary accounts. See Brett R. Turner,
Equitable Division of Property, § 6, p. 336-337, ft. 221:
"The concept of a coverture fraction applies only to defined benefit plans.
Because proration by contributions is always more accurate than proration
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by time, it is error to use a coverture fraction to determine the marital
interest of a defined contribution plan."
For representative cases, see Mann v. Mann, 470 S.E. 2d 605 (Va. App. 1996); Smith v.
Smith, 22 S.W. 2d 140 (Tex. App. Houston 2000); In Re Hester, 856 P.2d 1048 (Or. App.
1991); Tanghe v. Tanghe, 115 P.3d 567 (Ak 2005); and, Paulone v. Paulone, 649 A.2d
691 (Pa. Super. 1994).23 As stated in In Re Hester, p. 1149:
"When the value of a particular plan is determined by the amount of employee
contributions, application of the time rule could result in a division of property
that is demonstrably inequitable. For example, when an employee's monthly
contributions to such a plan before the marriage were relatively small and
contributions during the marriage much larger, application of the time rule would
effectively average the contributions over time, thereby distorting the value of the
plan attributable to contributions made both before and during marriage. As a
result, the employee would be awarded a larger percentage of the benefits than his
or her actual premarital contributions would justify."
The above principles are aptly identified in the present case. Here, the
overwhelming growth of the Respondents retirement accounts, $447,964.18 out of
$583,358.48, grew during the period of the parties' marriage, from 2/13/93 to 3/1/01.
Presumably, under Dunn and Englert, supra, the Petitioner was entitled to one-half of the
increase, or $223,982.18.24 Yet, by applying the modified coverture fraction under the
Smith Model, the total growth was spread out over the period of 4/7/69 (Respondent's
date of hire) to 3/1/01 (date of retirement), or 31.90 years and each year was given equal
value in terms of growth. (Trial Exhibit R-3, Exhibit 6 and Transcript, p. 156). As a
result, the Petitioner was only awarded $66,274.60. The trial court's ruling effectively

The Paulone decision contains an excellent examination of why "time rules" or coverture
fractions may not be used to identify, value and divide non-future interests such as defined
contribution plans. "Because of the distinct nature of each of these plans, their method of
valuation is different as well." Paulone v. Paulone, supra, p. 693-696.
24
For simplicity of argument, passive appreciation on the Respondent's premarital interest is not
considered.
36

denied the Petitioner her right to receive one-half of the contributions made to the
Respondent's retirement plans, one-half of the enhanced benefits, as well as her right to
receive one-half of the appreciation on the marital interests in those plans in violation of
the rule enunciated in Dunn, supra, p. 1319.
The Petitioner also pointed out to the trial court, without success, that the
coverture fraction used by Smith, the "modified" part, was also improper. Smith's
coverture fraction did not follow the Woodward formula or any other coverture fraction
approved by any other court. Instead of dividing the total service years by the total years
of marriage to arrive at the coverture fraction, Smith divided the total service years by the
total years of marriage dating from date of marriage to date of retirement (Trial Exhibit
R-3, Exhibit 6, and Transcript, p. 156, 249). By doing so, he shorted the marital period in
the coverture fraction by four years in his percentage calculations involving the BRP and
theDCP. 25
The incongruity of Mr. Smith's analysis of the coverture fraction is also
demonstrated by comparing the fraction he used with the BRP and the DCP to the
fraction he used for the 401k. In the former, involving the BRP and DCP, his fraction
was 75.79% premarital and 23.86 marital. In the latter, involving the 401k, his fraction
was 34.45% premarital and 65.55% marital. (Compare Trial Exhibit 3, Exhibit 6 to
Exhibit 2.1).

This calculation alone would cause a large disparity using Mr. Smith's own methodology.
Under his modified coverture fraction, the percentages he used were 75.79% premarital and
25.21% marital. (Trial Exhibit R-3, Exhibit 6). Had he used the proper period of marriage, or
twelve years, the percentages would have been 62.38% premarital and 37.62% marital. This
would have resulted in a "swing" to the Petitioner ultimately of $53,133.05 alone. The
calculations in this footnote are based upon the court's findings, Findings 24 (401k plan), 32
(DCP), and 39 (BRP).
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The Petitioner argued to the court that modifying the coverture fraction, as Smith
did, was clearly an abuse of discretion. (Record, p. 262-263). Even assuming a
Woodward coverture fraction was appropriate to divide the interests, the Smith Model
did not give credit to the Petitioner for the full length of marriage. Cf. Ramsey v.
Ramsey, 792 N.E. 2d 337 (111. App. 2003)(enhanced benefits post divorce must apply
periods of enhancement equally to nominator and denominator elements).
Recognizing this problem, the trial court attempted to fix the inequity by two
"equitable adjustments". The first "equitable adjustment" was by the court deciding to
apply Alternative 2 in the analysis of the DCP Plan as an "equitable adjustment".26 (See
Findings of Fact, No. 15 and 31 and Transcript, p. 774). However, the court's ruling on
Alternative 2 did not give the Petitioner anything more that what she was already entitled
to receive under the law. The trial court's "equitable adjustment" was illusory. Clearly,
what alternative to apply under the Smith Model was a legal decision based upon the
court's interpretation of Restated Appendix D of the DCP Plan, Trial Exhibit R-13, pages
47-52. The interpretation of a written document is a question of law and not a question of
fact and should be reviewed for correctness giving no deference to the trial court. Pack v.
Case, 30 P.3d 436, 440 (Ut. App. 2001)(and cases cited therein). Here, the plain
language in Restated Appendix D demonstrated that, despite the salary levels were
frozen, this was only an incidental and minor factor in the calculation of the ultimate
defined benefit. Employees were still required to put in years of service in order to

Alternative 2 is discussed under Facts, supra, Part B and G, regarding the DCP.
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become eligible and qualify for benefits as in any other defined benefit plan.

And, in

this case, the Respondent became eligible and qualified for benefits by working service
years during the period of the marriage. The Respondent's position that all of his DCP
interests were premarital because the salary levels became frozen fails as a matter of law
under a simple reading of Restated Appendix D. Therefore, the trial court gave nothing
to the Petitioner through the "equitable adjustment" claimed by the trial court.
The second "equitable adjustment" by the trial court came as a result of the trial
court's reading of the Temporary Order. The Petitioner claimed that the Respondent's
continued withdrawals of $2,100.00 violated the Temporary Order and were wrongful
withdrawals under Painter v Painter, 752 P.2d 907 (Ut. App. 1988)(withdrawals in
violation of a temporary order must be restored by the errant party). The Respondent
argued that the Temporary Order was ambiguous. In a second effort to fix the improper
application of the modified coverture fraction in the Smith Model, the trial court ruled as
an "equitable adjustment" that the Respondent should restore the marital estate $2,100.00
for each month after the date of the Temporary Order. (See Findings of Fact, No. 15 and
36 and Transcript, p. 770). Again, this was a feckless equitable adjustment. The
Temporary Order, paragraph 8, clearly restrained both parties from "selling, gifting,
transferring, alienating, pledging, or otherwise disposing of the parties' marital assets."
In this case, not only did the Respondent continue to take out $2,100.00 per month after
the Temporary Order, he continued to use the IRA accounts as his own personal piggy
bank and took other withdrawals totaling $59,922.89. Therefore, the trial court provided

27

Noteworthy is the fact that defined benefits in defined benefit plans ordinarily do not increase
over time. Trustees of such plans will increase the value of the defined benefit if the plan assets
permit an increase based upon actuarial principles. However, these increases occur infrequently.
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the Petitioner nothing by way of its equitable adjustment regarding the wrongful
withdrawals.
In summary on this point, the trial court's application of a coverture fraction, and,
indeed, a flawed coverture fraction, was a clear abuse of discretion. Mann. Smith. Hester.
Tangle, and Paulone. supra. Given the fact that there was clear evidence of the premarital
values of the BRP and DCP under Trial Exhibit 4, the trial court's abuse of discretion
resulted in an in a serious inequity that should be remedied on appeal. Under Dunn and
Englert application of the coverture fraction operated to deny the Petitioner her rightful
one-half interest to the contributions made during the marriage, one-half of the enhanced
benefits, and one-half of the active appreciation on such contributions.
C. Additional Flaws in the Smith Model
Below, the Petitioner also took issue with what the Petitioner considered other
flaws within the hypothetical Smith Model. One involved the active-passive appreciation
rules as applied to the 401k plan analysis. Although Utah has not expressly ruled on this
concept, other courts have made the distinction:
"Appreciation caused by marital contributions is known as active appreciation,
and it constitutes marital property in the first instance.
Appreciation caused by other factors, including separate contributions
and non-marital forces, is known as passive appreciation, and it remains
within the separate estate. Appreciation in marital property remains
marital property, of course, regardless of the cause. This active
appreciation rule is presently followed by an overwhelming majority of
dual classification equitable distribution jurisdictions."
Brett R. Turner, Equitable Division of Property. §5.22, p. 233 (and cases cited therein).
Contributions to a savings plan or a defined contribution plan, plus matches from the
employer, as well as forfeitures, during the marital period are deemed to constitute active
appreciation and must be segregated from the passive appreciation afforded premarital
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interests. Id., and see Weiler v. Weiler, 629 N.E.2d 1216, 1220-1224 (111 App. 1994)(a
case where the court rejected a formula identifying appreciation on premarital interests
that is remarkably similar to the one used in this case).
In the present case involving the 401k plan, Mr. Smith first identified what he
believed was the Respondent's premarital interest as it existed on the date of the marriage
on 2/13/93. (Exhibit 3 of Trial Exhibit R-3). He found the premarital interest to be
$31,530.68.28 Next, Mr. Smith calculated the Respondent's appreciation on his
premarital interest for the period of 2/14/93 to 3/31/01. (Exhibits 2.1 and 4 of Trial
Exhibit R-3). His calculation consisted of an extrapolation by using the beginning and
ending balances of annual statements and obtaining total growth for a given year. He
then calculated an estimated annual rate of return on the premarital interest by adding all
contributions (including company match) and dividing the result in two (presumably to
reflect equality in the premarital-martial contributions) and dividing assumed earnings.
(See footnote 4 to Exhibit 4 of Trial Exhibit R-3).
What this mathematical calculation did, in effect, was to weight heavily, to
Respondent's advantage, the formula identifying the appreciation of his premarital
interest. Instead of adding all of the contributions together during a given year, and
dividing them in two, he should have ignored the contributions altogether in his formula
because contributions made by both the participant and the Company, as well as
forfeitures, during the marital period is deemed active appreciation and included in the
marital estate. Smith's formula also allocated appreciation from marital interests to the

As explained earlier, Mr. Smith failed to offset this amount by a premarital loan against the
401k in the amount of $8,664.73. This was corrected by the trial court.
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Respondent's premarital interest. The Respondent was only entitled to appreciation on his
premarital interest.
While all of the above may appear to be trivial at first, the impact of this
miscalculation is demonstrated by the end result the miscalculation causes. In this case,
the error was compounded because Mr. Smith then used the appreciated premartial
interest as of 3/1/01, to calculate a percentage of the total funds left in the IRA account.
(Here, his calculation resulted in a 34.45% premarital and 65.55% martial). If one
eliminates the flaw in Mr. Smith's analysis of appreciation on the premarital interest, the
ultimate result is that the percentage of premarital decreases and the marital increases by
nearly 10%. The Respondent's ultimate premarital interest expressed in dollars should
have been $45,642.44 instead of $63,941.88 as expressed in Exhibit 2 of Trial Exhibit R3. (24.45% X $186,676.67).
No question exits that the Respondent was entitled to appreciation on his
premarital interest. However, he has the burden of proof on this issue. Elman. Here, it
was error for the trial court to allow active appreciation, or fifty percent of contributions
from the Respondent and the Company during the marital period, as well as forfeitures
and appreciation on those interests, to enhance the appreciation on the Respondent's
premarital interest.

III. THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR TRIAL BELOW AS WELL AS ON
APPEAL.
A trial court has the power to award attorney fees in divorce
proceedings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989). The award should be based
on evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse

42

to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331,
1337 (Utah Ct.App.1988). A decision to make such an award and the amount thereof rest
primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. Kerry. Kerr, 610P.2d 1380, 1384
(Utah 1980). A court may consider, among other factors, the difficulty of the litigation,
the efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the
case, the fee customarily charged in the locality, the amount involved in the case and the
result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved. Rasband, 752
P.2d at 1336. It is an abuse of discretion to award less than claimed without any
reasonable justification if other factors supporting an award are present. Bell v. Bell,
surpa, 494.
The trial court awarded the Petitioner limited attorney's fees below. (Findings of
Fact, f 69). The trial court awarded limited fees because it was a "difficult case and the
parties [were] unable to resolve any issue brought before the court...." (Id., % 66). No
Rasbund issues existed as to Petitioner's need and the Respondent's ability to pay. The
trial court found the Respondent had greater income and large retirement assets but the
trial court awarded the Petitioner the sum of $7,500.00. (Id., % 67). It was a limited
award because the Petitioner's fees had exceeded $20,000.00. Respondent's fees had
exceeded $35,000.00.
The Petitioner respectfully submits that the court's rationale for not awarding full
fees to the Petitioner was a clear abuse of discretion. Bell, supra. The Petitioner is not
aware of any legal precedent that allows a trial court to limit fees simply because the
parties could not agree on any issue to be decided by the court. Moreover, in this case,
thorny legal issues existed that made it nearly impossible for the parties to agree,
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especially where such radically different legal theories were being argued relative to the
division of the retirement accounts. The Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court
award her full fees incurred before the trial court and remand for appropriate findings to
be made to implement such an award.
The Petitioner also respectfully requests an award of attorney's fees on appeal if
she is successful in this appeal. Again, the Petitioner requests that this Court remand for
appropriate findings to be made to implement such an award.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The Petitioner urges this Court to reject the Smith Model and reject the notion that
a coverture fraction can be used to divide premarital from marital interests in savings
plans such as IRA accounts. Here, there was clear, reliable credible evidence as to the
premarital interests of the Respondent in the BRP and DCP and should be adopted as
reflective of the Respondent's premarital interests. (Trial Exhibit P-4).
With respect to the BRP, DCP, and 401k, the court should deduct the
Respondent's premarital interests from the amounts rolled over into the three IRA
accounts.29 The Respondent's premarital interests should, of course, be awarded to him.
Then, the court should order, as the trial court did below, that the Respondent restore the
amounts wrongfully withdrawn from such accounts, along with appropriate interest on
such withdrawals. The resulting sum should then be divided equally.

The Petitioner suggests that the Court remand for purposes of having the trial court determine
an appropriate passive rate of appreciation on such premarital interests with a directive that it
may not include any active appreciation. If the Respondent cannot meet his burden of proof, then,
under Elman, all appreciation should be deemed marital and included in the marital estate.
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The Petitioner also requests that this Court order that the trial court award the
Petitioner full fees for trial below and, if successful on appeal, remand for purposes of
determining a reasonable attorney's fee and costs for the appeal.
Dated this g? day of August, 2005.

STEPHEN W. COOK
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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ADDENDA
ADDENDUM A: DECREE OF DIVORCE

RODNEY R. PARKER (A4110)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRENDA JOY OLIEKAN,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,

No. 024702297
Judge Glen R. Dawson

v.
RONALD Y. OLIEKAN,
Respondent.

This case was tried to the Court on May 26, June 24, July 22, August 25, October 1, and October
20, 2004. Petitioner was represented by Stephen W. Cook and respondent was represented by Rodney
R. Parker. The Court, having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being fully advised
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Petitioner be, and hereby is, awarded a Decree of Divorce from the respondent and the

marriage between petitioner and respondent be and hereby is dissolved, and the parties are hereby free
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and absolutely released from the bonds of matrimony and all obligations thereof, with said Decree to
become final upon entry thereof.
2.

There are no minor children born of the marriage and none are expected.

3.

Respondent is ordered to pay alimony to petitioner in the amount of $500 per month for a

period of 118 months commencing November 1, 2004. Alimony shall terminate upon remarriage of or
cohabitation by the petitioner in a sexual relationship, or the death of either party.
4.

Respondent is awarded a fraction of any benefit due petitioner under the Utah State Re-

tirement System plan, the numerator of which is 4,279, and the denominator of which is 8,252.
5.

The petitioner is awarded 40.96 percent of the Smedley Financial Services account no.

*******0400. A qualified domestic relations order shall issue to facilitate a tax free transfer of petitioner's share of this account to her. The balance in the account is awarded to respondent as his sole and
separate property.
6.

The petitioner is awarded 14.80 percent of the World Financial Group account no.

******3915. A qualified domestic relations order shall issue to facilitate a tax free transfer of petitioner's share of this account to her. The balance in the account is awarded to respondent as his sole and
separate property.
7.

The petitioner is awarded 5.39 percent of the World Financial Group account no.

******3916 as of June 16, 2004. A qualified domestic relations order shall issue to facilitate a tax free
transfer of petitioner's share of this account to her. The balance in the account is awarded to respondent
as his sole and separate property.
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8.

The parties shall assume separate responsibility for debts incurred after December 15,

9.

Respondent shall assume and pay, and hold petitioner harmless from, the Debtscape con-

2002.

solidation loan.
10.

Respondent shall assume and pay, and hold petitioner harmless from, the income tax li-

ability incurred on the withdrawal of funds from the Smedley account to facilitate closing of the sale of
the marital residence.
11.

Petitioner is awarded the 1996 Nissan Maxima.

12.

Respondent is awarded the 1998 GMC truck, and shall assume and pay, and hold peti-

tioner harmless from, the debt associated with that asset.
13.

Respondent is awarded the Dutchmen Lite 26FK trailer, and shall assume and pay, and

hold petitioner harmless from, the debt associated with that asset.
14.

Respondent is awarded the time share interest and points.

15.

Respondent is awarded the ownership interest in the 2000 truck.

16.

The Lenox collection is awarded to respondent.

17.

Respondent is awarded the burial plots at Memorial Estates in Davis County, Utah (Gar-

den of Reverence 196 A 1-2) as his sole and separate property.
18.

Respondent shall be given the opportunity to copy family photographs of his choice at his

own expense. Where duplicate prints already exist, they shall be divided.
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19.

Respondent is ordered to pay petitioner $7,500 toward attorney's fees and a judgment for

such amount shall enter

Ji

>'(*

DATED this _P_ day ofJPebwary-, 2005.
BY

GLElLflKRAWSO.
SECO1
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
COOK & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

By.
Stephen
Stephen W. Cook
Attorney for Petitioner
N\21686\1\DECREE DOC 2/22/05
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ADDENDUM B: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW

RODNEY R. PARKER (A4110)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRENDA JOY OLIEKAN,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
No. 024702297
v.
Judge Glen R. Dawson
RONALD Y. OLIEKAN,
Respondent.

This case was tried to the Court on May 26, June 24, July 22, August 25, October 1, and October
20, 2004. Petitioner was represented by Stephen W. Cook and respondent was represented by Rodney
R. Parker. The Court, having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, and being folly advised,
enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:

024702297

OUEKAN.RONALD Y

FINDINGS OF FACT
Jurisdiction and Grounds for Divorce
1.

Petitioner and respondent are husband and wife, having been married on February 13,

1993 in Bountiful, Utah.
2.

Petitioner was an actual and bona fide resident of Davis County, State of Utah for more

than three months immediately prior to the filing of this case.
3.

The parties separated on or about December 15, 2002. Under the Temporary Order en-

tered in this case on February 4, 2003, each party was ordered to assume and pay, and hold harmless the
other from, their own individual debts and obligations from the date of their separation. Also, under the
Temporary Order, the parties were restrained and enjoined from selling, gifting, transferring, alienating,
pledging, or otherwise disposing of the parties' marital assets.
4.

There are irreconcilable differences of the marriage making continuation of the marriage

relationship impossible.
Parties
5.

The petitioner was born June 6,1950 and is age 54. She is employed by the State of Utah

and has been an office manager and supervisor in the department of Adult Probation and Parole for the
past 11 years. She is in good health although she has been treated with medication for depression.
6.

The respondent was born November 12, 1946 and is age 57. He is retired from Utah

Power & Light Company and PacifiCorp, where he worked as a construction supervisor in line work and
substation construction. He began working for Utah Power & Light Company on April 7, 1969 and accepted an early retirement package from its successor company, PacifiCorp, on March 1, 2001 as part of
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PacifiCorp's Workforce Transition Retirement Program. He presently does consulting work on PacifiCorp jobs. He is presently in good health, but has had back problems and takes medication for control
of diabetes.
7.

There are no minor children born of the marriage and none are expected.
Property Division

8.

Both parties brought assets into the marriage which the Court has attempted to identify

pursuant to the requirements of Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
9.

At the time of the marriage, both parties had equity in homes that they owned. After the

marriage, the petitioner sold her home and the parties occupied the respondent's home as the marital
residence. During the course of the marriage, the home equity both parties brought into the marriage
was consumed by joint spending and no longer exists. On August 22, 2002, the parties refinanced their
residence, paid off $42,883.00 in credit card debt, and the respondent received back the sum of
$2,403.00 from the closing. As of that date, the debt on the residence exceeded its value by approximately $50,000.00.
10.

Petitioner is a participant in the Utah State Retirement System. She joined the plan April

19, 1982 and accrued 3,953 days of service in the plan prior to the date of the marriage, and she remained employed by the State of Utah as of the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this case. As
of November 1, 2004, petitioner had accrued 4,279 days of service during the marriage. This benefit
should be divided pursuant to the formula set forth in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah
1982). Respondent should be awarded a fraction of any benefit due under the plan, the numerator of
which is 4,279; and the denominator of which is 8,252.
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11.

Respondent was a participant in three retirement plans offered by his employer prior to

his retirement on March 1, 2001. The Respondent's employer, PacificCorp, decided to reduce its workforce in 2001. As part of its Workforce Transition Retirement Program, PacificCorp offered the Respondent the opportunity to retire under the terms of that program with enhanced benefits, as identified
in Respondent Exhibits 7, 14, and 15. The Respondent received a lump sum distribution in the total
amount of $583,358.48 on the date of his retirement, March 1, 2001, that he placed into three separate
IRA rollover accounts that are identified below.
12.

Respondent was a participant in the PacifiCorp 401(k) plan prior to and during the mar-

riage. This plan was a defined contribution plan. At the time of his retirement, respondent received the
funds in this account in a lump sum distribution of $186,676.67. Those funds were rolled over into
Smedley Financial Services account no. *******0400. On June 16, 2004, the account balance was
$161,617.83.
13.

Respondent was a participant in the Utah Power & Light Company Deferred Compensa-

tion Plan prior to and during the marriage. This plan was a defined benefit plan. At the time of his retirement, respondent received the funds in this account in a lump sum distribution of $146,430.58.
Those funds were rolled over into World Financial Group account no. ******3915. On June 16, 2004,
the account balance was $125,234.70.
14.

Respondent was a participant in the PacifiCorp Basic Retirement Plan prior to and during

the marriage. This plan was a defined benefit plan. At the time of his retirement, respondent received
the funds in this account in a lump sum distribution of $250,251.23. Those funds were rolled over into
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World Financial Group account no. ******3916.

On June 16, 2004, the account balance was

$175,255.17.
15.

The Court in the following treatment of respondent's retirement plans has attempted to

identify the marital portion earned during the eight years the of marriage prior to March 1, 2001, by giving equal credit for each year of respondent's service in the plans. The Court believes that its decision to
give equal credit for each year of respondent's service in the plans is consistent with the approach set
forth in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), although the Court also recognizes that the
formulas that it is applying are not strictly Woodward formulas because the benefits were converted to
lump sums before the end of the marriage. The Court also recognizes that a large amount of the retirement benefits accrued during the marriage during respondent's last years of service and intends to make
some equitable adjustments to recognize that.
16.

Respondent's 401 (k) plan had an account balance of $29,915.85 on the date of marriage.

That balance included a loan of $8,664.73 against the account which should be deducted from that beginning balance, resulting in an adjusted beginning balance of $21,251.12. The Court believes it is appropriate to apply the actual rate of return earned in the plan to determine the appreciation on that adjusted beginning balance from the date of the marriage through the date of the distribution on March 1,
2001. See Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83
^f 18, 45 P.3d 176. Accordingly the Court has adopted the calculation of rates of return shown on Exhibit D3 A, page "exhibit 4." Using that methodology, the premarital portion of the final account balance on March 1, 2001 was $43,349.76, calculated as follows:
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Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
17.

Days
321
365
365
365
365
365
365
365
90

Beginning
Balance
$21,251.12
$21,188.21
$21,770.87
$26,304.87
$28,493.30
$30,915.30
$34,589.52
$37,145.72
$43,464.64

Return
-0.34%
2.75%
20.83%
8.32%
8.50%
11.88%
7.39%
17.01%
-1.07%

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Ending
Balance
21,188.21
21,770.87
26,304.87
28,493.30
30,915.30
34,589.52
37,145.72
43,464.64
43,349.76

Accordingly, as of March 1, 2001, $43,349.76 of the total amount of $186,676.67 in this

account was respondent's premarital property. Respondent's premarital share may thus appropriately be
expressed in terms of a percentage of the total account balance. The Court finds that 23.22 percent of
the March 1, 2001 rollover distribution to the Smedley Financial account consisted of respondent's separate property, and that 76.78 percent of the account balance should be included in the marital estate.
18.

During the pendency of this action, the respondent withdrew certain sums from the par-

ties' IRA accounts as identified below. Some of those withdrawals were made in violation of the Temporary Order . The Court finds and concludes that the petitioner's interest in the marital estate should be
made whole by requiring the respondent to properly account for such withdrawals.
19.

On April 23, 2002, $24,977 was withdrawn from the Smedley Financial account Those

funds were used to purchase a car for the parties' daughter, to pay taxes associated with the withdrawal,
and for a charitable contribution. This withdrawal should be charged to the marital portion of the account because it occurred well before the parties' separation and was not used for the exclusive benefit
of one party to the exclusion of the other.
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20.

On March 21, 2003, $13,888.89 was withdrawn from the Smedley Financial account.

That withdrawal occurred after separation and the withdrawn funds were not used for a marital purpose.
Accordingly, this withdrawal should be charged to the separate portion of the account.
21.

On February 26, 2004, $20,834 was withdrawn from the Smedley Financial account.

That withdrawal occurred after separation and the withdrawn funds were not used for a marital purpose.
Accordingly, this withdrawal should be charged to the separate portion of the account.
22.

On August 10, 2004, $69,500 was withdrawn from the Smedley Financial account. The

withdrawal was authorized by the Court to enable the parties to complete the sale of the marital residence which was ordered by the Court during trial. Of the withdrawn funds, $48,072.54 was paid to
complete the sale of the residence, $19,580 was withheld for the payment of income taxes which will be
respondent's obligation, and $1,847.46 was divided equally by the parties at the time of closing of the
sale. This withdrawal was used to extinguish marital debt and should be charged to the marital portion
of the funds in the account.
23.

Earnings or losses that would have accrued in the accounts on the unauthorized with-

drawals should also be restored to the account balances prior to calculation of the marital and separate
portions so that the marital estate is not deprived of those earnings or losses that would have been earned
on the funds had they not been withdrawn.
24.

As of June 16, 2004, the marital portion of this account was $75,030.32 and the separate

portion was $16,552.39. The following chart summarizes the Court's calculations regarding the marital
and separate portions of the Smedley Financial account:
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June 16 2004
Value

Add withdrawals during
separation

Add earnings
on withdrawals

401K plan

$161,617.83

$

$

Withdrawals during Separation

$

$

W/d due to sale of home

$ (69,500.00)

Total

.SL32J1LS3

25.

59,699.89

$
1___5SL6_99._89

(535.11)

$
$
.$

Cash value
prior to withdrawals
$ 220,782.61

$ 169,507.321

$

$

$ (24,977.00)

$ (34,722.89)

$ (69,500.00)

$

$
(5_3_5J1)

Pre Marital
Portion

Marital Portion

$ 220.782.61

J_7£,030,22

51,275.282

$_J&5_52,39

The petitioner should be awarded one-half of the marital portion of the Smedley Finan-

cial account as of June 16, 2004, together with any appreciation or loss on her portion of the account
from that date through the date of distribution. A qualified domestic relations order shall issue to facilitate a tax free transfer of petitioner's share of this account to her. The balance in the account should be
awarded to respondent as his sole and separate property.
26.

Respondent's Deferred Compensation Plan ("DCP") was a defined benefit plan and thus

had no relevant account balance at any time prior to its conversion to a lump sum on March 1, 2001.
The terms and conditions of the DCP are described in Restated Appendix D of Exhibit D13.
27.

From his original hire date of April 7, 1969 through his retirement on March 1, 2001, re-

spondent accrued 11,651 days of service. Of those days, 8,714, or 74.79 percent, accrued prior to the
marriage. Accordingly, 74.79 percent of the amount distributed from the DCP on March 1, 2001 was
respondent's separate property.
28.

On January 15, 2003, respondent withdrew $25,200 from the DCP monies. He gave

$700 of that amount to petitioner to assist in payment of the parties' state income taxes. The remainder
of the funds from that withdrawal were used by respondent for his own personal benefit in a manner that

1
2

76.78% of 220,782.61
23.22% of 220,782.61
-8-

did not benefit or enhance the marital estate. Accordingly, $24,500 of the withdrawal should be charged
to respondent's separate portion of this account and $700 should be charged to the marital portion.
29.

As part of his early retirement under the DCP, respondent was provided with certain in-

centives. Those incentives included the calculation of benefits using two additional years of service and
two additional years of age under the plan formula. Although the foregoing incentives were made available to respondent during the marriage, they were the result of all of his years of service under the plan,
not simply his years of service during the marriage. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that the
early retirement incentives should be divided utilizing the same formula as is used to divide the portion
of the distribution that was not the result of early retirement incentives.
30.

The Court rejects petitioner's contention that the separate portion of the DCP can be cal-

culated based upon the amount that would have been distributed under the plan's benefit formula if respondent had been permitted to retire on February 13,1993 because he was not eligible for retirement on
that date and thus could not have received that amount, and because adopting that calculation would result in years of service for benefit accrual not being treated equally.
31.

The Court rejects respondent's contention that the DCP is entirely a premarital asset. The

Court believes that there needs to be some recognition that, even though the plan's benefit level was frozen under the DCP prior to the marriage, the parties work together during the years of the marriage allowed Mr. Oliekan to retire, and respondent was required to be an employee on the date of retirement in
order to qualify for the benefit. The Court's decision to include the entire DCP as a marital asset is an
equitable adjustment for the time of petitioner's contribution to the marriage (see paragraph 15).
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32.

As of June 16, 2004, the marital portion of the DCP funds contained in World Financial

Group account no. ******3915 was $38,046.83 and the separate portion was $90,460.79. The following chart summarizes the Court's calculations regarding the marital and separate portions of World Financial Group account no. ******3915:
June 16 2004
Value

Add withdrawals during
separation

Add interest
on withdrawals

Deferred Comp Plan

$125,234.70

$

$ 3,272.91

$ 153,707.61

$

38,746.83

Withdrawals during Separation

$

$

$

$

$

(700.00)

JL-2L21231

$ 153.707.61

$

38.046.83

Total

$±25_2342Q

33.

$

25,200.00

25.200.00

Cash value
prior to
withdrawals

Marital Portion

Pre Marital Portion
$ 114,960.79
$ (24,500.00)
$

90.460.79

The petitioner should be awarded one-half of the marital portion of the World Financial

Group account no. ******3915 as of June 16, 2004, together with any appreciation or loss on her portion of the account from that date through the date of distribution. A qualified domestic relations order
shall issue to facilitate a tax free transfer of petitioner's share of this account to her. The balance in the
account should be awarded to respondent as his sole and separate property.
34.

Respondent's Basic Retirement Plan was a defined benefit plan and thus had no relevant

account balance at any time prior to its conversion to a lump sum on March 1, 2001. The terms and
conditions of the Basic Plan are described in Exhibit D13.
35.

From his original hire date of April 7, 1969 through his retirement on March 1, 2001, re-

spondent accrued 11,651 days of service. Of those days, 8,714, or 74.79 percent, accrued prior to the
marriage. Accordingly, 74.79 percent of the amount distributed from the Basic Plan on March 1, 2001
was respondent's separate property.
36.

At the time of his retirement, respondent commenced monthly withdrawals of $2,100

from the Basic Plan. From March of 2001 and continuing through the trial, respondent withdrew $2,100
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per month from the Basic Plan. In February of 2003, an order was entered in this case providing, "Each
party is restrained and enjoined from selling, gifting, transferring, alienating, pledging, or otherwise disposing of the parties' marital assets." Both as an equitable adjustment (see paragraph 15), and also because of paragraph 8 of the Temporary Order, the monthly withdrawals from March 2003 through June
of 2004 from the Basic Plan, in the total amount of $33,600, are treated as marital property rather than
income and are deemed to have been taken from respondent's share of marital property. The balance of
the withdrawals, $48,300, occurred during the marriage and prior to separation and is deemed to have
come from marital funds and not in violation of the Temporary Order.
37.

As part of his early retirement under the Basic Plan, respondent was provided with cer-

tain incentives. Those incentives included the calculation of benefits using two additional years of service and two additional years of age under the plan formula, and the provision of a Social Security
"bridge" benefit of $44,208.45. Although the foregoing incentives were made available to respondent
during the marriage, they were the result of all of his years of service under the plan, not simply his
years of service during the marriage. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that the early retirement
incentives should be divided utilizing the same formula as is used to divide the portion of the distribution that was not the result of early retirement incentives.
38.

The Court rejects petitioner's contention that the separate portion of the Basic Plan can be

calculated based upon the amount that would have been distributed under the plan's benefit formula if
respondent had been permitted to retire on February 13, 1993 because he was not eligible for retirement
on that date and thus could not have received that amount, and because adopting that calculation would
result in years of service for benefit accrual not being treated equally.
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39.

As of June 16, 2004, the marital portion of the Basic Plan funds contained in World Fi-

nancial Group account no. ******3916 was $19,472.03 and the separate portion was $161,247.14. The
following chart summarizes the Court's calculations regarding the marital and separate portions of
World Financial Group account no. ******3916:
June 16 2004
Value

Add withdrawals During Separation

Add interest
on withdrawals

Cash value
prior to withdrawals

$ 5,464.00

$ 260,519.17

$

$

$

$ (46,200.00)

Basic Retirement

$175,255.17

$

Withdrawals during Separation

$

$

Total

$175T255.17

$

40.

79,800.00

79£QCLQQ

' -

$ 5.464.00

$ 260.519.17

Marital Portion

J

65,672.03

19,47&fl3

Pre Marital Portion
$ 194,847.14
$ (33,600.00)
$ 161,247.14

The petitioner should be awarded one-half of the marital portion of the World Financial

Group account no. ******3916 as of June 16, 2004, together with any appreciation or loss on her portion of the account from that date through the date of distribution. A qualified domestic relations order
shall issue to facilitate a tax free transfer of petitioner's share of this account to her. The balance in the
account should be awarded to respondent as his sole and separate property.
41.

There was no equity in the marital residence. The residence was refinanced in August of

2002 to discharge debts that were incurred during the marriage. The home was sold in August of 2004
pursuant to order of the Court. The Court rejects both of the parties' contentions that they had separate
property interests in the marital residence, finding that those interests were consumed by spending during the marriage.
42.

Pursuant to the Court's temporary order entered in February of 2003, the parties assumed

separate responsibility for debts incurred after December 15, 2002.
43.

Respondent has a debt of $61,296 to Debtscape, representing a consolidation of credit

card debt on an American Express card, an MBNA card, and a CitiMiles card. Respondent conceded
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that $43,386.28 of that amount was incurred after December 15, 2002 or was otherwise not chargeable
to the marital estate. The amount in dispute was therefore $17,909.72.
44.

Of that disputed amount, $1,515.72 originated with the American Express card. The

Court finds that the sum of $769.90 incurred to purchase a digital camera that respondent retained, and a
finance charge of $50.62, should be excluded from the marital estate, and thus includes $695.20 of the
American Express debt as marital debt of the parties.
45.

Similarly of that disputed amount, $982.10 originated with the MBNA card. The Court

finds that the sum of $774.00 incurred to purchase symphony tickets should be excluded from the marital estate because the petitioner did not receive any benefit from those tickets, and thus includes $208.10
of the MBNA debt as marital debt of the parties.
46.

Similarly of that disputed amount, $15,411.90 originated with the CitiMiles card. The

Court finds that the sum of $1,500 incurred as a cash advance by the respondent should be excluded
from the marital estate, and thus includes $13,911.90 of the American Express debt as marital debt of
the parties.
47.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the marital portion of the Debtscape con-

solidation loan is $14,815.20.
48.

In connection with the withdrawal of funds from the Smedley account to facilitate closing

of the sale of the marital residence, income tax liability was incurred of $30,012.88. This is a joint debt
of the parties. Pursuant to IRS regulations, $19,580 was withheld from the distribution for payment of
taxes, leaving a net remaining tax obligation on the withdrawal of $10,432.88, which is a joint debt of
the parties.
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49.

Petitioner should be awarded the 1996 Nissan Maxima at a value of $4,650, which the

Court finds takes into consideration the mileage on the vehicle and the damage petitioner described to
the vehicle.
50.

Respondent should be awarded the 1998 GMC truck at a net value of zero. Although the

debt exceeds the value of the truck by approximately $2,500, the Court has determined that the value
should be set at zero as an equitable adjustment (see paragraph 15) and taking into consideration that
respondent had the use of the truck since it was purchased.
51.

Respondent should be awarded the Dutchmen Lite 26FK trailer at a net value of zero.

Although the debt exceeds the value of the trailer by approximately $2,100, the Court has determined
that the value should be set at zero as an equitable adjustment (see paragraph 15) and taking into consideration that respondent had the use of the trailer since it was purchased.
52.

Respondent should be awarded the time share interest and points at a value of $ 10,500.

53.

The Court finds that respondent has an ownership interest in a 2000 truck which should

be valued at $6,000. He provided $6,000 in cash down payment in addition to the trade-in of a truck
belonging to Janice Hartwell, and the truck is titled in his name.
54.

Respondent received a check from the refinance closing that occurred in August of 2002

of $2,414.00 and a refund check from American Express of $2,229.85 in November of 2002. The
$2,414.00 was prior to separation and is treated as a reduction in joint funds. The $2,229.85 was postseparation and should be charged to respondent in the calculation of division of personal property.
55.

The Lenox collection is entirely marital property and is valued at $4,650 and is awarded

to respondent.
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56.

In other respects, the Court adopts the valuation and distribution of personal property set

forth in Exhibit P50. Based upon that decision, the Court finds that petitioner has received personal
property valued at $8,600 and respondent has received personal property valued at $33,850.85.
57.

The net difference in the award of personal property favors respondent by $25,250.85.

The total amount of marital debt found by the Court is $25,248.08. The Court accordingly finds that the
respondent should assume and pay, and hold petitioner harmless from, the marital debt of $25,248.08,
plus the remainder of the Debtscape consolidation loan, and the debts on his truck and his trailer. The
Court believes this equalizes the division of property in this case as equitably as possible.
58.

Respondent should be awarded the burial plots at Memorial Estates in Davis County,

Utah (Garden of Reverence 196 A 1-2) as his sole and separate property, having acquired them prior to
the marriage.
59.

Respondent should be given the opportunity to copy family photographs of his choice at

his own expense. Where duplicate prints already exist, they should be divided.
Alimony
60.

The petitioner's gross monthly income from her employment with the State of Utah is

$3,896.71. Her payroll deductions are as shown on page 2 of Exhibit P40A, except the Court finds that
her federal income tax amount is $268.71 and that the Savings Plan deduction of $100 per month is not
an appropriate deduction to be taken into account in determining need for alimony. With these changes,
her net monthly income is $2,107.83
61.

The respondent's gross monthly income from his consulting employment is $5,204.39.

In addition, respondent receives a withdrawal of $2,100 per month from World Financial Group account
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no. ******3916, formerly the Basic Retirement Plan, for a total gross monthly income of $7,304.39.
His net monthly income is $4,863.33.
62.

Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses are as shown on Exhibit P40A, with the follow-

ing exceptions: The Court finds that the horses can be maintained less expensively, at a cost of $250 per
month; the petitioner has an additional monthly need of $54 for auto insurance not shown on Exhibit
P40A; and the Court treats the tithing expense of $102 as a voluntary payment which is not appropriately included in the calculation of alimony. The Court also notes that petitioner testified to a desire for
$300 per month for vacations, but the Court finds that expense is not appropriate for either party given
their financial circumstances. Accordingly, petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses are $2,531.68.
63.

Respondent's reasonable monthly expenses are as shown on Exhibit D16, with the fol-

lowing exceptions: The Court believes the request to include trailer park fees of $340 per month as well
as a housing expense of $900 per month is a duplication and is not reasonable. The Court characterizes
the $340 per month trailer park fee as a business expense. In addition, the Court struggles with the appropriateness of including the entire amount of the Debtscape consolidation loan payment in respondent's budget because a large portion of that debt was incurred after separation. The Court finds that
respondent has an ability to pay alimony of $450 per month.
64.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders respondent to pay alimony to petitioner in the

amount of $500 per month for a period of 118 months. Alimony shall terminate upon remarriage of or
cohabitation by the petitioner in a sexual relationship, or the death of either party. The Court justifies
the lack of mathematical precision in the calculation of alimony on the basis of fault, finding that the
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respondent engaged in a relationship with another woman that commenced shortly before separation of
the parties and continued thereafter.
Attorney's Fees
65.

Both parties have incurred substantial attorney's fees. As of the beginning of the fourth

day of trial on August 25, 2004, petitioner had incurred attorney's fees of approximately $25,000 and
respondent had incurred attorney's and expert fees of over $40,000. After those figures were computed,
there were three more days of trial, including necessary preparation. Accordingly, the fees and expenses
of the parties are substantially more than the amounts stated herein.
66.

This has been a difficult case and the parties have been unable to resolve any issue

brought before the Court, including evidentiary issues. The Court does not want to reward either party
for the expansion of the effort in this case.
67.

By virtue of his income and his large retirement assets, respondent has the greater ability

to pay attorney's fees.
68.

Petitioner has a need for assets to pay attorney's fees because she has less ability to earn

income and because she needs to preserve the retirement assets she has been awarded as she grows
older.
69.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that respondent should be ordered to pay

petitioner $7,500 toward attorney's fees and a judgment for such amount should be entered.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and of the marriage pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 30-3-1(2).
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2.

Petitioner should be granted a decree of divorce from respondent on grounds of irrecon-

cilable differences pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-l(3)(h).
3.

The foregoing findings of fact are incorporated herein as conclusions of law and shall

form the basis for an equitable resolution of this issues of property settlement, alimony, and attorney's
fees in this case. A Decree of Divorce shall be entered consistent with the foregoing findings of fact.
DATED this _£_ day of£eb»My, 2005.
BY THE COURT

^xiiLJvtCWoGLEN R. DAWSON, JUDGE
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
COOK & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

A.(JbSL£

By.
Stephen W. Cook
Attorney for Petitioner
N:\21686\ l\FTNDrNGS_4.DOC:2/22/05
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ADDENDUM C: PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT 4 (VALUE OF
RESPONDENT'S RETIREMENT ASSETS AS OF DATE OF
MARRIAGE).

49

825 N.E. MultnomakSuite 1800
Portland, Oregon 97232
800-455-6363

tPACIFlCORP
Benefits Services

February 21,2003

y

Ronald Oliekan
52 Tumbleweed Drive
Lander, WY 82520
RE: Retirement Calculation Request
Dear Mr. Oliekan;
You recently requested an estimate of the lump sum retirement benefit you would have
received if you had retired on April 1,1993.
For the Basic Retirement Plan, you would have received a one-time payment of
$46,148.94.
For the Deferred Compensation Retirement Plan, you would have received a one-time
payment of $67,994.24.
I hope this information is helpful. Please let me know if you need anything else.
Sincerely,

Shena Harris
Benefits Administrator
PacifiCorp Benefits Services
1-800-455-6363

ADDENDUM D: RESPONDENT'S TRIAL EXHIBIT 7
(RETIREMENT STATEMENT SHOWING WORKFORCE
TRANSITION BENEFITS).

50

# PACIFlCORP
Emplcyoc Benefits

Your Personal Retirement Statement
A Summary of Your Benefits Under the Workforce Transition Retirement Program

Prepared for Ronald Y Ouekan
Prepared on; January 9,2001
Personal Data
Ifyou have any question? about the data used in yow calculations, please contact Benefit Sennets
at 1-800-455-6363 as soon at possible.
Employee Number:
3861
Social Security Number
529-64-1358
Birth Date:
1I/12M6
Enhanced Monthly Fay as of February 2S, 2001;
$5,893 80
Enhanced Years of Benefit Service as of February 28,2001:
33 8333
Spouse Date of Birth:
06/04/50
Workforce Transition Retirement Program Benefits vs. Regular Retirement Benefits
These figures for your workforce transition retirement benefit a«ume termination on February 28, 2001 and arc subject to
adjustment for actual retirement See page 2 for <*»t»flg about bow your Workforce Transition Retirement Benefits were
calculated Please read your Workforce Transition Retirement Program Guide for more information about your opaora
Workforce Transition Retirement Benefits
At Age: 54.25
Assuming a Termination Date of 02/28/01
Monthly Annuity
Lump Sum
(for your lifetime)*
Pension Benefit
Bridge Benefit
DCF Benefit

Regular Retirement Benefits
!
At Age-54.25
Assuming a Termination Date of: 02/28/01 I
Lump Sam
1
Monthly Annuity
(for your lifetime)

$2,159 44

$206,042.78

$1,468 97

$148,302.52]

$500 to Age 65

$44,20S 45

Not Available

Not Available

$837.42

$146,430 58

$780.77

$131,789.631

'Set pages 3 and 4 for payment amounts under other options.
Retiree Medical Subsidy
Your enhanced age plus service total 90 points. This cmidcs you to a company subsidy of 90% toward the cost
oTyour retiree mcdiod benefits.

EXHIBIT
Workforce TntfttiLOfl Rttratisot PID^'HJU

a

Ai)0£*&un\ D
«*<«*

Calculation Details for Workforce Transition Retirement Program Benefits
Baste Data for Ronald Y Giiekan's Calculation
Actual years of benefit service:
Enhanced years of benefit service;
Actual age.
Enhanced age:
Five-year average monihJy pay as of February 2$, 2001.
Base pay rate as of January 1, 2001
Enhanced pay (greater of final average pay and 110% of base pay rate):
Year 2001 monthly social security covered compensation:

31.8333
33.8333
54.2500
56,2500
$5,434.27
IS,358.00
$5,893. B0
$4,529.00

Calculation of Workforce Transition Retirement Program Benefit on February 28, 2001
Your Calculations

[Formula.
YPacinCorD Regular Rarrpmf^ Formuja;

1 3% x $5,893.80x33.8333

1.3% x [EnhancedPay] x [Enhanced Service]

$2,592.29

PLUS
0 65% x [Enhanced Pay - Covered. CoropJ x [Enhanced Service]

0.65V. x ($5,893.80 - $4,929 00) x 33,8333

$2ais|
$2.804.471

J Total Enhanced Benefit Before Reduction
Ix fEnhunced Early Retirement Factor)

x.7700

$2,159.44

$60x20.0000

$1,200.00

Utah Mmimun Benefit FjynQpki:
[Short Service Factor] x (Enhanced Service np to 20 years]
PLUS
[Long Service factor] x [Enhanced Service over 20 years]

$25 x 13 8333

Tota) Enhanced Benefit Before Reduction

$345.83
$1,545.83

x.7700

x [Enhanced Early Retirement Factor]

$1.19029]

I JJiah Frozen $ert$fii Fcrmuiai
20% x [1991 Final Average Pay]

20.0% x $3,299 37

$559.87

1% x [1991 Final Average Pay] x [1991 Service up to 30 years]

L0%x$3y299.37x21OO00

$692.87

0.50% x [1991 Final Average Pay] x [1991 Service over 30 yeara]

0.5% x $3,299.37x0.0000

$0.00
$1,352 74

Total Enhanced Benefit Before Reduction
x [Enhanced Early Retirement Factor]

x.6900

$933.39

\Fcrmula Comparison:
PactfiCorp Regular Recrement Formula

$2,159.44

Utah Minimum Benefit Formula

$1,190 29

Utah Frozen Benefit Formula

$93339

[Greatost of Above

$2,159.44

Benefit Summary
Monthly annuity before age 65 m

$2,659.44

Monthly annuity after age 65 «

$2,159.44

ImmediBtt lump sum benefit*

$250,251.23

Wortdbce* Trtrine oo fcctinouem Prgspuw
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Basic retirement optional forms for Ronald Y Oliekan as of Feb man' 28,2001
if you elect an annuity for your basse benefit, you will receive the bndgc benefit as a $500 per mooth payment until you
reach age 65 Payment of the bndgc benefit will cease upon your death if dws happens before age 65 If you taka your
basic benefit as a lump sum, you must also take the bridge benefit as a lump sum.
Benefits must begin upon termination None of the benefits below may be deterred to a later date

Annuity Benefit Forms

Annuity Payable
Before Age 65

Annuity Payable
After Age 65

S2,65S 44

$2.159 44

$2,526 85

$2,026 S5

$2,40959

$lf909 59

$2,594 44

52,094 44

Lump Sum on
Basic Benefit

Total
LumpSum

S206\0417g

S250.25L23

Single Life Annuity
Thin opnon provides for o monthly annuity for your Uteume
When you die, all payments from the plan stop
50% Jomt & Survrvor Annuity
This option provides for a monthly annuity for your lifetime,
upon your death, your beneficiary would receive a continuing
monthly benefit equal to 50% of your monthly benefit for the
rest of his or her lite, or $1,013 43
100% Joint & Survivor Annuity
This option provide? for a monthly annuity for your lifeome>
upon your death, your beneliciary would receive a continuing,
monthly benefit equal to 100% of your monthly benefit for the
rest of his or her life, or $1^09 5°
10-Year Certain and Life Annuity
This option provide* for a monthly annuity for your lifetime,
however, if you should die before receiving benefits for ten
years, vour beneficiary would receive additional payment!
of S2,094 44 until a total of ten years nf payments had been
made

Lump Sum

Thw option provides for a single payment to you of the
actuarial equivalent of your Retirement Plan benefits

WorWbre* Tnastfum Hcftremcnc Profirsra
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DC? retirement optional forms for Ronald V Obekaa as of February 2&, 2001
You may dcct lo take your DC? benefit m one of these ways
As an immediate annuity,
Ai on immediate lump cum, or
You may elect to defer the start of your DCP benefit to a laiar tunc

Annuity Payable
Immediately

Annuity Jtentfit Forms

$928.20

15 Year Penod Certain
This option provide* for a monthly annuity for fifteen years;
however, if you should die before receiving benefit* for
fifteen ycort, your beneficiary \woold receive addition*]
payments of $928 20 until a toad of fifteen years of
payments had been made
Single Life Annuity

$83742

50% Joint & Survivor Annuity

5786,00

After you die, your beneficiary receives a monthly benefit
of$393 00
100% Joint & Survivor Annuity

$74053

After you die, your beneficiary receives a monthly benefit
of $740 53
10-Year Certain and Life Annuity

$812 22

]f you shuuld die beiore receiving benefit* for ten years,
your beneficiary would receive additional payments of
$832 22 until a total often years of payments had
been made

Lump Sure

$146r430.58

WoitTbrce Transition RefiroiKflt WogrWft
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ADDENDUM E: RESPONDENT'S TRIAL EXHIBIT 3 (SMITH
THEORY OF DIVISION OF IRA ACCOUNTS).

LECG
Ronald Oliekan
Summary

X

Retirement Benefit
c401 K Plan

/^""Deferred Compensation Plan
•J? Basic Retirement
C— Total

F<

Exhibit 1

Pre-Marital Balance
$63,941 88
$119,234 26
$168,475 49
$351,651 63

Marital Balance
$86,688 90
$0 00
$0 00
$86,688 90

Total
$ 150,630 78

Ref
From Exhibit 2, Note 1

$ 119,234 26

From Exhibit 5, Note 2

$ 168,475 4 9

From Exh&it 5 1, Note 2

$438,340 53

Note 1 Balance as of May 17, 2004
Note 2 Marital balances for defined benefit plans result in a negative balance for each plan (See Exhibits 5 and 5 1) Therefore, this summary exhibit assumes
the mantal balance for these defined benefit plans to be zero

EXHIBIT

LECG
Ronald Oliekan
Summary - 401K

Exhibit 2

Pre-Marital Percentage

From Exhibit 2J

Marital Percentage

From Exhibit 2.1

From Exhibit 7

May 17,2004 Value
410KPlan
Withdrawals during Separation
Total

$

Add Withdrawals
During Separation

Cash Value prior to
Withdrawals
Marital Portion

150,630.78 $

34,977.00 $

150,630.78 $

34,977 00 $

185,607.78 $
$
185,607.78 $

Pre-Marital
Portion
121,665.90 $
63,941.8
(34,977.00)
86,688.90 $
63,941.88

Note 1 Assumes that withdrawals are appropriately applied against the martial estate.

LECG

Ronald Oliekan

Exhibit 2.1

Summary - 401K
1

Periods

02/14/93
01/01/94
01/01/95
01/01/96
01/01/97
01/01/98
01/01/99
! 01/01/00
01/01/01

12/31/93
12/31/94
12/31/95
12/31/96
12/31/97
12/31/98
12/31/99
12/31/00 j
03/31/01 j

Days
321
365
365
366
365
365
365
366
90

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

From Exhibit 3

From Exhibit 4

Pre-Marital Balance

Estimated Return

$31,530 68
31,437 33
32,301 85
39,029 02
42,276 03
45,869 60
51,32111
55,113 80
64,489 29

-0 34%
2 75%
20 83%
8 32%
8 50%
11 88%
7 39%
17 01%
-1 07%

Pre-Marital Ending Balance 1
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Total Amount Received at Retirementl $
Pre-Marital Percentage
Marital Percentage

31,437 33
32,301 85
39,029 02
42,276 03
45,869 60
51,321 11
55,113 80
64,489 29
64,318.85 1
186,676.67 \
34.45%\(rounded)
6S.S5Vo\frounded)

LECG

Ronald Oliekan

Exhibit 3

Estimation of Pre-marital balance for 401KPlan
Total
Balance as of 10/01/93
Less Estimated Contributions Included
mBeg Balance
Assumed Beginning Balance

Ref

$37,990 00 From Exhibit 4
($6 ? 45932) Note!
$31^30.68

Note 1 Estimated contributions are computed as follows
Contributions in Q4
Company Match in Q4
Subtotal
Number of Quarters While Married
Assumed Contributions in Beg Balance

$2,693 03
$536 63
$3,229 66
$6 45932 Nate 2

Note 2 Due to fact that retirement plan reported negative earnings in 1993, we have assumed
zero earnings in beginning balance total

LECG
Ronald Oliekan
Analysis of401K Plan

Exhibit 4

Notel

!

Beginning Balance
Year
$37,990 00
1993
$41,086 34
1994
$47,254 32
1995
$71,822 74
1996
$72,473 65
1997
$113,264 99
1998
$111,323 22
1999
$142,520 84
2000
$180 186 46
2001

Notel

Estimated Contributions Assumed Company Match
$536 63
$2,693 03
$2,258 16
$8,172 32
$2,340 96
$9,797 40
$6,843 08
$4,534 20
$12,469 32
$1,53648
$6,145 88
$3,497 28
$11,326 90
$1,980 88
$3,961 76

Hotel

Note 3

Note 4

Assumed
Estimated
Loans Against
Earnings
Plan
Ending Balance Rate of Return
$41,086 34
($133 32)
-0 34%
$1,198 19
2 75%
$47,254 32
($5,460 69)
$1,199 97
$11,230 09
$71,822 74
20 83%
$72,473 65
$5,762 64
8 32%!
($11,954 81)
8 50%i
$16,215 53
$7,572 29
$113,264 99
$12,597 35
($22 221 48)
11 88% I
$111,323 22
$142,520 84
$9,045 44
$7,328 00
7 39% j
$25,296 52
$6,426 46
17 01%
$180,186 46
($1,976 81)
$8,467 02
$186.676 67
-1 07%

Note 1: Estlmsted contributions and assumed company match reflect an annualized total based on the amounts paid in tbc statements provided.
Note 2: Assumed earnings equals the amouat required to agree with year end balance after accounting for contributwn/match/loan activities
Note 3: Represents the net increase/decrease in loans from retirement plan.
Note 4: Computed by dividing Assumed Earnings by Beginning Balance Total and 1/2 of estimated contributwn/matdi/loan total for year.

LECG

Ronald Oliekan

Exhibit 5

Summary of Deferred Compensation Plan (World Financial 15T321391S)
Alternative 1:
From Exhibit 7

May 17,2004 Cash
Value
Deferred Comp Plan

Add Withdrawals
During Separation

Note l

Cash Value prior to
Withdrawals

$119,234.26

$25,200.93

$144,435.19

$119,234.26

$25,200.93

$144 435.19

Marital Portion
$0.00

Withdrawals during Separation
Total

Pre-Marital Cash
Value
$144,435.19

($13,185.64)

($12,015.29)

($13,185.64)

$132,419.90

Note 1 Assumes that withdrawals are appropriately applied against the marital estate.

Alternative 2:
% of Service Period Prior to
Marriage

14J9*/*

From Exhibit 6

% of Service Period During
Marriage

25.21%

From Exhibit 6

From Exhibit 7

Deferred Comp Plan
Withdrawals during Separation
Total

May 17,2004 Cash
Value
$119,234.26

Add Withdrawals
During Separation
$25,200.93

Cash Value prior to
Withdrawals
$144,435.19

$119,234.26

$25,200.93

$144,435.19

Marital Portion
$36,412.11
($13,185.64)
$23,226.47

Note 1 Assumes that withdrawals are appropriately applied against the marital estate.

Pre-Marital Cash
Value
$108,023.08
($12,015.29) Note 1
$96,007.79

LECG
Ronald Oliekan
Summary of Basic Retirement Plan (World Financial 15T3213916)
% of Service Period Prior to
Marriage

74.79%

From Exhibit 6

% of Service Period During
Marriage

25.21%

\rrom Exhibit 6
Notel
From Exhibit 7

Basic Retirement Plan
Withdrawals during Separation
Total

Notel

Exhibit 5.1

May 17,2004 Cash
Value
$168,475 49

Add Withdrawals
During Separation
$79,800 00

Cash Value prior to
Withdrawals and
Obligations
$248,275 49

$168,475 49

$79,800 00

$248,275 49

Marital Portion
$62,590 25
($79,800 00)

Pre-Marital Cash
Value
$185,685 24
$0 00

($17,209 75)

$185,685 24

Mr Oliekan has received a total of $79,800 from his Basic Retirement Fund from smce March 2001 which have been
used for general living expenses and obligations imposed by the temporary order in the case

LECG

Ronald Oliekan

Exhibit 6

Calculation of Benefit Periods
Ref

Original Hire Date

04/07/69

Date of Marriage

02/14/93

a
b

Days From Hire Date to Marriage Date

8,714

b-a=c

Days per Year
Years of Service Until Marriage Date

365.25
23.86

d
c/d=c

03/01/01
11,651

f-a=g

Date of Retirement
Days From Hire Date to Retirement Date
Days per Year
Years of Service
Marriage Period as a % of Service Period
Period Prior to Marriage as a % of Service Period

f

365.25
31.90

g/b=I

25.21%
74.79%

l-(e/I)
e/I

h

LECG
Ronald Oiiekan

Exhibit 7

Detail of Withdrawals made by Mr. Oiiekan from the Retirement Funds:
From the Basic Plan:
Basic Living
From the 401K Plan on March 18, 2003 and April 23, 2002 :
April 23, 2002
Purchase of a car for the Brenda's Daughter
Quarterly Taxes
Quarterly Taxes
Church
March 18, 2003
Payment of Taxes
Payment of Attorney Fees
401K Plan Total:
From the Deferred Comp Plan:
Lander Medical Center - January 2003
Condo Maint 2003
Brenda State Taxes
2002 Taxes
Moving Expenses
Living Expenses
4 Wheeler and Trailer
Chain Saw
Dresser
Car
Withdrawal Fee - Personal
Withdrawal Fee - Joint
Payment of Taxes - September 2003
Payment of Car Insurance for Both Parties
Payment of Attorney Fees
Loan to Friend
Deferred Comp. Plan Total

Total Withdrawals:
Note 1

$79,800.00

$20,500.00
$2,000.00
$1,477.00
$1,000.00
$4,780.00
$5,220.00
"

$34,977.00

$1,346 00
$325 00
$700 .00
$2,163 00
$578 00
$2,205 62
$3,320 00 Note 1
$475 00 Note 1
$1,028 56 Note 1
$2,858 82 Note 1
$102 91 Notel
$98 .02
$2,163 00
$1,100 00
$2,507, 00
$4,230, 00 Note 1
$25,200.93

$139,977.93

These disbursements are assumed to pertain to the Pre-Marital portion only.
Computed total equals:
$12,015.29

ADDENDUM F: TEMPORARY ORDER

52

STEPHEN W. COOK, USB #0720
STEPHEN W. COOK, P.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
323 South 600 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 595-8600
Telefax: (801)595-8614
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

BRENDAJOYOLIEKAN,
TEMPORARY ORDER
Petitioner,

:

vs.
Case No. 024702297
RONALD Y. OLIEKAN,
Respondent.

Judge Glen R. Dawson
Commissioner David S. Dillon

The Petitioner's Motion For Order To Show Cause, and Order To Show
Cause, came on regularly before the Court, Commissioner David S. Dillon,
presiding, on February 4, 2003, at the hour of 9:30 a.m. The Petitioner was
present and was represented by her counsel, Stephen W. Cook. The
Respondent was present and was represented by Rodney R. Parker. The
parties, having reached a resolution of the issues presented by the Petitioner's
Motion, read their stipulation into the record and the same was approved by the
Court. Based, thereon, the Court finds and concludes that the following
Temporary Order is reasonable and should be entered by the Court.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Petitioner shall be awarded on a temporary basis the parties5

residence and real property, and all contents located therein, that is commonly
located at 613 W. Applewood Drive, Centerville, Utah.
2.

The Petitioner and Respondent shall list the property for sale on the

multiple listing service through either Rick Tuller or Ron Aivey, whoever is
available and, in Petitioner's judgment, will provide the best service.
3.

Each party shall be awarded on a temporary basis that personal

property they each have in their respective possession, subject to any
indebtedness thereon. Each party are awarded their own separate vehicles,
subject to the indebtedness thereon.
4.

Each party is hereby ordered to assume and pay, and hold

harmless the other therefrom, their own individual debts and obligations from the
date of separation on December 15, 2002. In the event a dispute exists
concerning whether a debt was incurred before or after separation, either party
may petition the Court for a resolution.
5.

In addition to the Petitioner's own individual debts incurred since

separation, the Petitioner is ordered to pay the first mortgage on the parties'
residence to Dream House Mortgage in the approximate amount of $1,424.89
per month in a timely manner.
6.

In addition to the Respondent's own individual debts incurred since

separation, the Respondent is ordered to pay the second mortgage on the

Oliekan Temporary Order *** page
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parties' residence to Dream House Mortgage in the approximate amount of
$562.25 per month in a timely manner, the debt to CitiBank, MBNA, the
indebtedness on the Dutchman Trailer, and American Express.
7.

The Respondent is hereby ordered to pay the Petitioner the sum of

$800.00 per month as temporary alimony, one half on the 1 st and the other half
on the 15th of each month.
8.

Each party is restrained and enjoined from selling, gifting,

transferring, alienating, pledging, or otherwise disposing of the parties' marital
assets.
9.

The parties are ordered to attend at least one session of mediation

before seeking a final pretrial conference in this matter.
10.

The Petitioner's request for attorney's fees shall be reserved for

trial.
DATED this

day of

, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID S. DILLON
District Court Commissioner
Approved as to form:

RODNEY R. PARKER
Attorney for Respondent

Oliekan Temporary" Order *** page
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